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Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability 
Problem 
Mitchell N. Berman* & Kevin Toh** 
Introduction 
The following statements are representative of what contemporary 
originalists and nonoriginalists say in their debates with each other about 
constitutional interpretation and adjudication: 
(O) “Originalists do not give priority to the plain dictionary 
meaning of the Constitution’s text because they like 
grammar more than history.  They give priority to it 
because they believe that it and it alone is law.”1 
(N) “[T]he Court should interpret written words, . . . in the 
Constitution . . . , using tools that help make the law 
effective in practice.  Judges should use traditional legal 
tools, such as text, history, tradition, precedent, and 
purposes and related consequences, to help find proper 
legal answers.”2 
Although it is usual to read this pair of passages and similar ones as 
presenting radically divergent and conflicting positions,3 that is not required.  
For, strictly speaking, these two passages offer different answers to different 
questions.  (O) on its face articulates a position about what the law is or 
consists of.  The content of the constitutional law, according to (O), consists 
of the meanings of the inscriptions in the text that is called “The 
Constitution” of the United States.  (N), on the other hand, apparently stakes 
out a position about how judges should decide or adjudicate constitutional 
disputes.  They should resolve such disputes, (N) says, by appealing to the 
named multiplicity of considerations or factors.  A view about what the law 
is or what it consists of does not by itself entail or presuppose any position 
about how judges are supposed to adjudicate constitutional disputes; and a 
view about how judges should go about adjudicating constitutional disputes 
 
 * Richard Dale Endowed Chair in Law, Professor of Philosophy, The University of Texas at 
Austin. 
 ** Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, San Francisco State University.  We thank 
Alex Tsesis for inviting us to contribute to this symposium, participants at the symposium held at 
the University of Texas for constructive reactions and suggestions, Larry Alexander for helpful 
comments on a previous draft, and Brian Bah for excellent research assistance. 
1. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 
104 YALE L.J. 541, 552 (1994). 
2. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 73–74 (2010). 
 3. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854–56 
(1989) (emphasizing the differences between originalism and nonoriginalism). 
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does not by itself entail or presuppose any position about what the law is or 
consists of.  The positions articulated by (O) and (N), therefore, seem 
compatible. 
In fact, however, the actual proponents of each view are very likely to 
reject the other view.  The current proponents of the view articulated by (O) 
maintain that, subject to a few standard qualifications, 4  judges deciding 
constitutional cases must enforce the constitutional law.5  And most actual 
proponents of the view that (N) articulates presumably reject the idea that the 
constitutional law consists solely of the meanings of the inscriptions in the 
constitutional text.6   The bottom line is that although frequent and even 
typical contemporary formulations of originalism and nonoriginalism outline 
positions that are strictly speaking consistent with each other, almost 
certainly the proponents of the two views actually do disagree with each 
other.  But while nonoriginalists have frequently challenged the position 
articulated by (O)—i.e., the originalist position about what the law is or 
consists of—they have very rarely articulated a positive position that can be 
deemed a straightforward alternative and competitor to (O).7  Consequently, 
originalists have been placed in a position of having to engage with 
nonoriginalist positions that have not been spelled out. 
Some originalists do not see a need to scrutinize the details of the 
nonoriginalist position that (N) can be taken as implying or suggesting.  For 
according to them, any view of our constitutional law that conceives it as 
consisting of a plurality of considerations or factors is bound to be unstable 
or even incomprehensible. 8   A number of constitutional theorists have 
explicitly articulated this “combinability problem,” as we will call it, and our 
sense is that the problem resonates with very many constitutional theorists, 
including even some nonoriginalists.9  The purported problem, to reiterate, 
 
4. The exceptions, recognized by some but not all self-described originalists, include: those 
relating to deference to judicial precedents that may appear erroneous when measured against the 
originalist standard; a “faint-hearted” willingness not to enforce legal norms that are too morally 
objectionable or that are likely to provoke overwhelming public opposition; and a prerogative to 
displace or supplement some interpreted norms with constitutional “constructions.”  See, e.g., 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 140 (1997) 
[hereinafter SCALIA, INTERPRETATION] (asserting that “stare decisis is not part of [Scalia’s] 
originalist philosophy; it is a pragmatic exception to it”); Scalia, supra note 3, at 864 (stating that 
“faint-hearted originalist[s]” would not uphold a statute that legalized flogging as punishment). 
5. See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1823–24 
(1997) (distinguishing between originalists’ position on the content of the law and their position on 
adjudication and making the sociological observation that originalists believe that judges should 
enforce the law). 
6. See infra subpart I(C). 
7. See infra subpart I(C). 
8. See infra Parts III–IV. 
9. See infra Parts III–IV. 
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attaches to nonoriginalism precisely because and insofar as nonoriginalism is 
pluralistic.10 
One primary purpose of this Article is to discredit the combinability 
problem, and thereby facilitate development and eventual acceptance of 
pluralistic nonoriginalism.  The other, perhaps more important, purpose is to 
devise a pluralistic nonoriginalist conception of constitutional law that is 
clear and plausible enough to provide a focal point for debates about 
constitutional interpretation.  We will begin in Part I by introducing some 
terminological regimentation that should prove helpful for our subsequent 
exposition and by disambiguating different theses that originalists and 
nonoriginalists, respectively, could be seen as advocating.  We propose in 
Part II a template for a pluralistic nonoriginalist conception of constitutional 
law that is plausible in its own right and that also will enable us to address 
later on in Part IV what we deem the most forceful version of the 
combinability problem.  We turn to the combinability problem in earnest in 
Part III.  Despite the explicit articulations in the literature, it is no trivial 
matter to figure out what exactly the combinability problem is and why 
exactly pluralistic nonoriginalist conceptions of the constitutional law are 
supposed to suffer from it.  Accordingly, we disambiguate and try out three 
different versions of the problem, disarming each in turn.  In Part IV, we 
identify a fourth version of the combinability problem, which strikes us as 
most serious.  The idea, in short, is that legal norms, or norms generally, 
cannot be constituted by considerations, facts, or reasons of many kinds.  We 
argue that the force of even this last version of the problem is merely 
apparent and that the problem gains traction only by way of understanding 
the nature of constitutional law that is far from nonoptional and ultimately 
less credible than an alternative.  We will invoke the template for pluralistic 
nonoriginalism that we sketched in Part II to discredit the fourth version of 
the problem.  Our goal throughout this Article is not so much to solve the 
combinability problem, but instead to dissolve it by exposing and making 
explicit a number of assumptions and predilections among constitutional 
theorists that are very much dispensable in favor of some more credible 
alternatives. 
I. Preliminaries 
A. Terminology 
We begin with some terminological regimentation, and some related 
observations, to facilitate the reader’s comprehension of our subsequent 
discussion. 
 
10. For a previous expression of this point, see Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Interpreta-
tion: Non-Originalism, 6 PHIL. COMPASS 408 (2011). 
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Imagine that, by reasoning as follows, we conclude that a set of laws 
that make up a certain regime of criminal punishment—call the regime 
“CP”—is constitutionally prohibited:  
(1) Inflictions of cruel and unusual punishments are 
constitutionally prohibited. 
(2) CP calls for inflictions of punishments that are cruel and 
unusual. 
________________________________________________________ 
(3)  CP is constitutionally prohibited. 
Here, we could say that the unconstitutionality of CP consists of two things—
i.e., the constitutional prohibitedness of inflictions of cruel and unusual 
punishments, and the cruel and unusual nature of the punishments that CP 
calls for.  A number of other idioms are available to designate this relation 
between (3) on the one hand and (1) and (2) on the other.  We could say, for 
example: that CP’s unconstitutionality is grounded in (1) and (2); that CP is 
unconstitutional in virtue of (1) and (2); that CP’s unconstitutionality is 
determined by (1) and (2); etc.  We will use the term “determination” to refer 
to the relation that such locutions posit between the facts like (1) and (2) on 
the one hand and facts like (3) on the other.11  And we will use “determi-
nants” to refer to the facts that determine, and “resultants” to refer to the facts 
that are determined. 
Some observations go with these terminological stipulations.  First, 
notice that once we know the determinants of a legal fact like (3), we also 
know one good way that we can come to have justified or warranted belief 
that (3) is the case.  In other words, an epistemological implication about the 
relevant evidence can be inferred from an assertion of a determination 
relation.  If we were warranted in thinking that (1) and (2) are the case, then 
we would also be warranted in believing that (3) obtains.  So, one very good 
way of establishing that (3) is the case is to show that (1) and (2) obtain. 
Second, having said what we have just said, we also need to caution.  
Not all of the facts that count as evidence are determinants, and that means 
that we sometimes come to have justified or warranted belief that a fact 
obtains by way of our exposure to some facts that are not determinants.  For 
example, the fact that a local meteorologist has said that it will rain tomorrow 
is good evidence that it will rain tomorrow, and hearing him say so justifies a 
belief that it will rain tomorrow.  But the fact that it will rain tomorrow does 
not consist of—is not determined by—the fact that the local meteorologist 
has said so.  The lesson is that we need to be careful not to confuse 
 
11. One of us (Toh) is not entirely happy with thinking of (1)–(3), and other such sentences, as 
representing facts because doing so begs some important metanormative questions—namely, those 
about the meanings of normative claims and the metaphysical status of norms and values.  But 
given the purpose of this paper and its intended audience, no harm is likely to come from relying on 
the formulations we use. 
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determinants and evidence.  Some facts are evidence without at the same 
time being determinants.  The two sets of facts overlap, but there are bound 
to be divergences. 
Third, a fact that is a resultant may in turn be a determinant of a further 
resultant, and a fact that is a determinant of a resultant may itself be a 
resultant of some more fundamental determinants.  Notice that instead of 
worrying about the determinants of a legal fact like (3), we could worry 
about the determinants of a legal fact like (1).  We may ask: What grounds 
(1), or by virtue of what is (1) true?  It may be the case, for example, that (1) 
is made true by something like the following pair: 
(4) For all P, if the Founders drafted a text that says that P, 
and the state ratifying conventions ratified that text shortly 
after 1789, then P is a constitutional law. 
(5) The Founders drafted a text that says (1), and the state 
ratifying conventions ratified that text shortly after 1789. 
If these were really the case, then (4) and (5) would be the determinants of 
(1).  (4) would be a more fundamental legal fact, and (5) is a nonlegal, 
historical fact that (4) makes legally relevant. 
Fourth, and last, notice that any kind of nonlegal fact may be made 
legally relevant by way of determinant legal facts.  Notice that (2) is a 
(partly) moral fact, and that (5) is a historical fact.  Both kinds of facts, and 
any other kinds—semantic, psychological, historical, prudential, structural, 
etc.—could be made legally relevant, and generative of further legal facts, by 
the operations of fundamental legal facts like (1) and (4).  This is a very 
important point and will play a crucial role in our subsequent arguments. 
Equipped with these observations, we proceed by first resuming the task 
we began in the introductory Part—that of distinguishing different originalist 
and nonoriginalist theses. 
B. Originalism 
A fuller version of the passage that we quoted and labeled “(O)” in the 
introductory part reads: 
The central premise of originalism (and of Marshall’s opinion in 
Marbury) is that the text of the Constitution is law that binds each and 
every one of us until and unless it is changed through the procedures 
set out in Article V.  It follows that the Constitution is thus like other 
legal writings, including statutes, contracts, wills, and judicial 
opinions.  The meaning of all such legal writings depends on their 
texts, as they were objectively understood by the people who enacted 
or ratified them.  Originalists do not give priority to the plain 
dictionary meaning of the Constitution’s text because they like 
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grammar more than history.  They give priority to it because they 
believe that it and it alone is law.12 
According to this view, what the inscriptions in the constitutional text say or 
mean, and that alone, is the constitutional law.  The view could be 
formulated as: 
(OL) The Constitution or the constitutional law consists solely 
of the meanings of the inscriptions in the constitutional 
text. 
Here, Steven Calabresi and Sai Prakash, the authors of the above passage, are 
advancing a legal claim or, more precisely, designating what they deem the 
primary determinant of the ultimate constitutional facts.  (OL) makes legally 
relevant certain semantic facts—namely, the meanings of the inscriptions in 
the text of the U.S. Constitution—and together with those semantic facts 
determines the most fundamental or ultimate constitutional facts, or the facts 
regarding what the Constitution calls for.  Putting aside complexities 
presented by whatever contributions judicial decisions might make to the 
content of constitutional law, (OL) represents a common originalist legal 
position.13 
A certain epistemological position follows from originalists’ legal 
position (OL), and we can formulate it as follows: 
(OE) In order to figure out what the constitutional law calls for, 
judges and others should find out only what the meanings 
of the inscriptions in the constitutional text are, and any 
other evidence that bears on the meanings of those 
inscriptions. 
Since what the inscriptions mean is what the Constitution calls for, in order 
to figure out what the Constitution calls for, one must seek out the meanings 
of the inscriptions in the constitutional text.  And any facts that bear on what 
the inscriptions mean, and only such facts, are good evidence for beliefs 
about what the Constitution calls for.  As we observed above, some facts that 
are not determinants of a particular fact may be good evidence for thinking 
 
12. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 1, at 551–52 (last emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
13. It is a common originalist position, but not the only one.  Some originalists—from icons 
like Bork and Scalia to contemporary theorists like John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport—
advance claims that, on their face, appear to be about how judges should decide constitutional cases 
and not about what the law is.  See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971) (“The judge must stick close to the text and the 
history, and their fair implications, and not construct new rights.”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1698–99 (2010) (providing 
normative and consequentialist justifications for why judges should render originalist decisions); 
Scalia, supra note 3, at 863 (asserting that originalism in judicial review is preferable because its 
“practical defects” are “less severe”).  That is, some originalists seem more plainly to be playing in 
the same space that nonoriginalists seem mostly to occupy.  We explore some consequences of this 
intramural division within the originalist camp in Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What 
Distinguishes New Originalism From Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013). 
2013] Pluralistic Nonoriginalism 1745 
 
 
 
that that fact obtains.  For example, what a particular late-eighteenth-century 
dictionary says is clearly not a determinant of the constitutional law but may 
still be good evidence for what the Constitution demands.  And that is the 
case only if we have good grounds for thinking that the particular dictionary 
is a reliable tracker of the meanings of the terms as they are used in the 
constitutional text.  The exact kind of investigation that (OE) calls for then 
depends on the kind of investigation that is needed to figure out the meanings 
of inscriptions and to discern the facts that bear on those meanings.  Randy 
Barnett has opined as follows: 
It cannot be overstressed that the activity of determining semantic 
meaning at the time of enactment . . . is empirical, not normative.  
Although we can choose to use words however we wish, . . . the social 
or interpersonal linguistic meaning of words is an empirical fact 
beyond the will or control of any given speaker . . . .  Although the 
objective meaning of words sometimes evolves, words have an 
objective social meaning at any given time that is independent of our 
opinions of that meaning, and this meaning can typically be 
discovered by empirical investigation.14 
If this were really the case, then what (OE) calls for is strictly non-normative, 
empirical reasoning. 
In addition to their legal and epistemological positions, summarized as 
(OL) and (OE) above, there is another issue on which many originalists can 
be seen as taking a position.  That issue can be called “the issue of judicial 
duty,” or more plainly the issue of what judges should do when they are 
adjudicating constitutional cases.  In the following passage, which strikes us 
as representative of views espoused by many originalists, Nelson Lund seems 
to be taking a firm position on this third issue, while also asserting (OL): 
  I have always had a very simple-minded view of judicial duty in 
constitutional cases: Supreme Court Justices should just apply the 
law. . . . 
  If I had to put a label on my own position, it would be 
“originalism.”  The Constitution is a written document that means 
what its words, in context, would reasonably have been understood to 
mean at the time it was adopted.15 
Notice that the issue of what judges should do in constitutional disputes is 
distinct from the legal issue of what the constitutional law is or consists of, 
and also from the epistemological issue of how to find out what the 
constitutional law is or calls for.  There is logical room for thinking that even 
if the constitutional law clearly calls for P, judges should not apply P or not 
 
14. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 
(2011). 
15. Nelson Lund, Stare Decisis and Originalism: Judicial Disengagement from the Supreme 
Court’s Errors, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1029, 1029 (2012). 
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apply P in some specified situations.16  Lund, like many originalists, rejects 
this last position.  Subject, then, to the caveats flagged earlier,17 this common 
originalist position on adjudication could be summed up as follows, at least 
on a first pass: 
(OA) In constitutional cases, when the meanings of the relevant 
inscriptions of the constitutional text are clear, judges 
should decide the cases before them only according to the 
meanings of those inscriptions. 
We believe that the dominant strand of contemporary originalism can be 
accurately characterized in terms of the three theses we have distinguished 
and formulated in this section.  We hope that distinguishing the three theses 
will facilitate progress in the debate between originalists and their opponents. 
C. Nonoriginalism 
We shall use the term “nonoriginalism” to refer to constitutional 
theories that reject originalism.  Another term often used to refer to the 
alternative to originalism—“living constitutionalism”—seems to us to bring 
with it various associations that are unnecessary and undesirable.18  Now, 
how should we characterize nonoriginalism?  Although it is fairly plain that 
nonoriginalists disagree with all three of the originalist theses that we 
distinguished in the preceding section, their positive positions on these three 
issues are considerably less clear. 
Common nonoriginalist positions on the issue of adjudication are easiest 
to decipher.  Larry Sager, for example, begins his Justice in Plainclothes19 by 
observing: “Various accounts of our practice disagree on the important 
question of whether the Constitution contains an essentially complete set of 
instructions for constitutional judges or whether conscientious judges and 
courts must make important judgments on their own[] . . . .” 20   And his 
position is that “conscientious judges” should indeed make important 
independent judgments, and in particular judgments of political morality, and 
adjudicate constitutional cases before them in ways that further political 
justice for their community.  “Judges are not merely or even primarily 
instruction-takers,” says Sager, “their independent normative judgment is 
expected and welcomed.”21  Similarly, other nonoriginalists have asserted 
that judges should, in their constitutional adjudications, “help make the law 
effective,” 22  proceed with “heightened . . . concern for consequences,” 23 
 
16. Once again, see Lawson, supra note 5, at 1831–35 for this very point. 
17. See supra note 4.  
18. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 24 & n.52 (2009). 
19. LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL PRACTICE (2004). 
20. Id. at 1–2. 
21. Id. at 76.  
22. BREYER, supra note 2, at xiii–xiv. 
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exercise judgment to “account for competing considerations,”24 etc.  There is 
no canonical list of nonsemantic considerations that nonoriginalists believe 
that judges should take into account in deciding constitutional cases.  But 
perhaps their counterpart to (OA) can be formulated as: 
(NA) In constitutional cases, even when the meanings of the 
relevant inscriptions of the constitutional text are clear, 
judges should decide the cases before them not merely 
according to the meanings of those inscriptions, but also in 
light of certain nonsemantic considerations, including 
some normative ones. 
The “even when” clause is inserted to distinguish nonoriginalists from those 
originalists who countenance reliance on nonsemantic, and perhaps even 
normative, considerations when the meanings of relevant constitutional 
provisions are unclear or otherwise underdeterminative.25 
Although (NA) is inconsistent with (OA), it is compatible with (OL) 
and (OE).  But clearly, a “nonoriginalism” that is committed to the latter two 
theses would be a fairly shallow form of nonoriginalism.26  The above-quoted 
passages from Sager, for example, explicitly rule out neither (OL) nor (OE).  
Our guess is that Sager means to opt for a more thoroughgoing 
nonoriginalism, but that is not obvious from what he says.  Similar diagnoses 
could be offered for other nonoriginalists’ proposals.  Philip Bobbitt 
famously enumerated six “modalities” of constitutional argument: historical, 
textual, structural, doctrinal, moral, and prudential.27  Similar lists abound in 
 
23. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 238 (2008). 
24. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4 (2009). 
25. The so-called New Originalists, for example, think that when the meanings of constitutional 
provisions are unclear or otherwise underdetermined, judges should move from constitutional 
interpretation to constitutional construction, and that the latter kind of adjudicative activity 
legitimately relies on nonsemantic and even normative considerations.  That, in any event, appears 
to be Whittington’s position.  See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American 
Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 120–21 (2010) (“Interpretation attempts to divine the 
meaning of the text.  There will be occasions, however, when the Constitution as written cannot in 
good faith be said to provide a determinate answer to a given question.  This is the realm of 
construction.” (footnote omitted)).  Barnett and Solum maintain that construction is ineliminable 
even when the communicative content served up by interpretation is entirely clear.  That is, 
interpretation, for them, always delivers only semantic meaning or communicative content; 
construction is always necessary to deliver law, even when the law precisely corresponds to the 
communicative content.  See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 14, at 66; Lawrence B. Solum, The 
Interpretation–Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 100, 107 (2010).  But we think 
this is an idiosyncratic and unnecessary wrinkle that other originalists have not fully appreciated and 
are unlikely to find congenial.  See generally Berman & Toh, supra note 13. 
26. In case this is not obvious, we are not making any normative assessments in calling such 
theories “shallow.”  We are merely giving a comparative description. 
27. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1982); PHILIP 
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]. 
1748 Texas Law Review [Vol. 91:1739 
 
 
the nonoriginalist literature.  Richard Fallon, for example, identified five 
“kinds of constitutional argument” that are near universally acknowledged as 
legitimate: arguments about the meanings of constitutional text; arguments 
about the Framers’ intent; arguments about purposes presupposed by 
constitutional provisions; arguments from judicial precedents; and evaluative 
and policy arguments.28  It is not always clear what such lists are supposed to 
represent.  Do they amount merely to nonoriginalist positions on what judges 
should do when they decide constitutional cases, and hence versions of 
(NA)?  Or do they amount to nonoriginalist positions on the epistemological 
issue of how best to uncover the constitutional law—hence, versions of 
(NE)—or even nonoriginalist positions on the legal issue of the fundamental 
legal facts in the American legal system—hence, versions of (NL)? 
 The term “constitutional argument” is equivocal, and so is 
“constitutional interpretation.”  A theory of constitutional interpretation may 
be thought of as a theory of how to discover the constitutional law, or as a 
theory of how judges should decide constitutional cases based on their 
findings of what the law is and possibly some other considerations as well.29  
And nonoriginalists have rarely been explicit about which of these two they 
are offering.  Perhaps it is a significant fact that recently some of them seem 
to have refrained intentionally from using the term “interpretation” to 
characterize what they are theorizing about. 30   And at least some 
nonoriginalists have explicitly opted to use alternative terms—e.g., 
“constitutional decisionmaking”—to clarify their subject matter. 31  
Presumably, the idea is that whereas constitutional interpretation has to do 
 
28. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194–209 (1987). 
29. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 4 (2011) (distinguishing “interpretation-as-
ascertainment” from “interpretation-as-construction”); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Case for 
Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 42, 60 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (distinguishing 
“clarifying” from “creative” interpretation); Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional and Statutory 
Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 268, 
269–70 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (noting a variety of meanings of legal 
interpretation); Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 
431, 448 (1989) (“[I]nterpretation is a portmanteau word so capacious that virtually nothing that a 
court might ‘do’ to or with a statute could not be thought interpretation in a semantically 
permissible, indeed orthodox, sense.”). 
30. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 23, at 15 (describing the book as “an effort to develop a 
positive decision-theoretic account of judicial behavior”).  Although David Strauss described his 
“common law” approach to constitutional adjudication as “common law constitutional 
interpretation” when he introduced his ideas nearly two decades ago, see David A. Strauss, 
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996), that phrase does not 
appear in his more recent book-length development, DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING 
CONSTITUTION (2010) [hereinafter STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION].  At the live conference 
for this symposium, Strauss confirmed that he thinks “interpretation” a misleading and unfortunate 
term for the central activity that courts are engaged in when adjudicating constitutional disputes. 
31. Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 182 
(2008). 
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with finding out what the constitutional law is, constitutional 
decisionmaking, or some such, has to do with the wider question of how 
judges should decide constitutional cases.  These could be taken as 
indications that what nonoriginalists are really advancing is an alternative to 
(OA), and no more.  This inference is possibly bolstered by the fact that 
some nonoriginalists have characterized constitutional argumentation, the 
subject matter of their theorizing, as a species of practical reasoning.  Justice 
Breyer, for example, in additional passages that further develop the idea 
presented in the passage we quoted at the beginning of this Article, has said: 
 In constitutional matters, too, language, history, purposes, and 
consequences all constrain the judge in that they separate better from 
worse answers even for the most open questions. . . . 
 . . . . 
 This may sound complicated, but consider how most practical 
arguments proceed: Should we invite your cousin to the wedding?  
Should we relocate the plant, when and where?  As is true of any 
practical argument, including moral arguments, rarely does a single 
theory provide a determinative answer.32 
It is not always clear just what nonoriginalists mean by practical reasoning.  
But the impression that writers like Breyer give is that what they are 
theorizing about is a set of judgments or an activity that is aimed not merely 
at delineating what the preexisting legal facts are, but at making up the 
judging persons’ minds as to what to do based on both legal and nonlegal 
considerations.33 
If we treat, as the foregoing considerations encourage us to do, 
nonoriginalist proposals as proposals for (NA) or its variants, then the debate 
about originalism should be conceived as a moral or all-things-considered 
normative debate about how judges should behave.  For the “should” of (OA) 
and (NA) presumably is a moral “should,” or perhaps an all-things-
considered “should.”  If alternatively the “should” were conceived as a legal 
“should,” then (OA) would be a trivial implication of (OL), and (NA) would 
either be a trivial implication of the nonoriginalist analogue of (OL) or a 
 
32. BREYER, supra note 2, at 84–85. 
33. The distinction that Breyer and similar-minded constitutional theorists seem to be working 
with, at least implicitly, is the distinction that moral philosophers often make using the terms 
“realism” and “voluntarism.”  See generally, e.g., CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF 
NORMATIVITY (1996).  Cf. Christine M. Korsgaard, Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-
Century Moral Philosophy, 28 J. PHIL. RES. (SUPPLEMENT) 99 (2003), reprinted in THE 
CONSTITUTION OF AGENCY: ESSAYS ON PRACTICAL REASON AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 302 
(2008).  According to realism, relevant judgments are meant to discern or find some preexisting 
facts, and their correctness-makers consist of such facts.  According to voluntarism, on the other 
hand, relevant judgments are substantially a matter of willing as well as of discerning or finding, 
and their correctness-makers consist at least partly of the desiderata of willing well.  We will 
discuss these matters further in Part IV below. 
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blatant contradiction of such.  Some originalists have discerned the resulting 
conception of the debate and have expressed some frustration about it.  
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, for example, says: 
The controversy over constitutional interpretation is concerned mainly 
with clarifying interpretation [i.e., the type of interpretation that aims 
to reveal “a meaning that, despite being previously obscured, was 
possessed by the text all along”34].  The central question is not how 
judges should decide constitutional disputes when the constitution 
itself proves insufficiently determinate to provide a solution, but how 
they should ascertain whether or not it does provide a solution and, if 
so, what that solution is.35 
Goldsworthy, for one, seems to think that some nonoriginalists are 
mistakenly applying the lessons of constitutional cases where the law is 
indeterminate to all constitutional cases, and that the resulting conception of 
the debate between originalism and nonoriginalism in terms of (OA) and 
(NA) trivializes or marginalizes it.36 
We agree.  We think that the debate between originalists and 
nonoriginalists is more substantial than the debate about (OA) and (NA).  Or 
at least it is not just a debate about those theses about adjudication.  We 
believe that the debate is best conceived as a legal one about what the 
constitutional law is or consists of.  (There also would be an epistemological 
difference implied by that legal difference.)  The problem is that 
nonoriginalists have not set out, not clearly anyway, an alternative positive 
legal position—something that merits the label “(NL).”37 
We suspect that the debate over constitutional interpretation has been 
significantly hampered by the absence of a clear articulation of the 
nonoriginalist alternative to (OL).  We also suspect that nonoriginalists’ near-
universal reticence in spelling out (NL) has been motivated by their inability 
to devise a conception of how the various different kinds of facts that they 
typically speak of could fit together into one coherent picture of what the 
constitutional law is.  As we pointed out in the Introduction, some 
originalists believe that nonoriginalists’ reticence is well-motivated, that 
there is an insuperable obstacle to combining the different kinds of facts or 
considerations that nonoriginalists typically discuss—viz., the combinability 
 
34. Goldsworthy, supra note 29, at 60. 
35. Id. 
36. See id. at 60–61 (arguing “[t]here should be little controversy” that if originalism “does not 
resolve the dispute,” nonoriginalist thought may be used, but that it is impermissible for judges to 
“change a constitution when it has a determinate meaning”). 
37. A notable and important exception is Ronald Dworkin who consistently presented a clear 
legal picture of what the law of a community consists of, which includes a picture of what the 
constitutional law of a community consists of, as well as the accompanying epistemological picture.  
See generally, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S 
EMPIRE]; Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975) [hereinafter Dworkin, Hard 
Cases], reprinted in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1977). 
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problem.38  We will do two things in the remainder of this Article.  First, in 
the next Part, we will formulate (NL) and provide a template of how the facts 
could line up so that (NL) provides an accurate picture of our constitutional 
law.  The picture we devise is not meant to be a wholly accurate picture of 
how things actually are.  In order to get at the accurate picture, a considerable 
amount of further legal and constitutional research will need to be carried 
out.  It is our view that what is sorely lacking in the current constitutional 
dialectic, what seems to be a stumbling block to the right kind of legal and 
constitutional research, is the lack of a picture or template of how the various 
kinds of facts could fit together into a single coherent constitutional fact.  
Our template in the next Part is meant to fill this gap.  Second, in Parts III 
and IV, we will defuse the combinability problem.  That problem, or the 
various versions of that problem we will disambiguate, have nothing on our 
template.  The appearance of the problem arises, we believe, from a number 
of confusions or mistakes on the part of those who proffer it.  We propose to 
make further progress in articulating the nonoriginalist legal position by 
exposing these errors. 
II. A Template for a Pluralist Nonoriginalist Conception of Constitutional 
Law 
Once again, there is no canonical list of the nonsemantic facts that 
nonoriginalists deem legitimate inputs for constitutional interpretation.  But 
we can use something quite like Bobbitt’s list of modalities as our 
placeholder and formulate the pluralist nonoriginalist legal and 
epistemological positions as follows:39 
(NL) The Constitution or the constitutional law consists of 
multiple kinds of facts or considerations including: (i) the 
meanings of the inscriptions in the constitutional text; 
(ii) the Framers’ and ratifiers’ shared intentions; 
(iii) judicial precedents; (iv) extrajudicial societal 
practices; (v) moral values and norms; and (vi) the norm 
of prudence. 
(NE) In order to figure out what the constitutional law calls for, 
judges and others should find out multiple kinds of facts or 
considerations including: (i) the meanings of the 
inscriptions in the constitutional text; (ii) the Framers’ and 
ratifiers’ shared intentions; (iii) judicial precedents; 
 
38. See infra Parts III–IV. 
39. We have dropped the structural considerations from Bobbitt’s list because: (i) we are unsure 
as to how to formulate a fundamental constitutional norm about structural features in a noncircular 
way—that is, without mentioning in the formulation of the norm what the Constitution envisions; 
and (ii) that set of considerations might be better construed as a subset of moral or ethical 
considerations.  Nothing of substance should hang on this, however. 
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(iv) extrajudicial societal practices; (v) moral values and 
norms; and (vi) the norm of prudence. 
And we can further update (NA) as follows: 
(NA') In constitutional cases, even when the meanings of the 
relevant inscriptions of the constitutional text are clear, 
judges should decide the cases before them in light of 
multiple kinds of facts or considerations including: (i) the 
meanings of the inscriptions in the constitutional text; 
(ii) the Framers’ and ratifiers’ shared intentions; 
(iii) judicial precedents; (iv) extrajudicial societal 
practices; (v) moral values and norms; and (vi) the norm 
of prudence. 
Our central goal is to firm up (NL).  A success in that endeavor would bring 
affirmations of (NE) and (NA') in its wake.  Now we turn to articulating a 
clear picture of the relation that (NL) bears to the constitutional law. 
A. Ultimate Constitutional Facts 
That relation, as we conceive it, is a little different from the relation that 
(OL) supposedly bears to the constitutional law, and we believe that a proper 
understanding of that difference would go a significant way in clarifying 
what (NL) says and in enhancing its plausibility. 
The difference between the two relations can be summed up in the 
following two figures: 
 
Figure O: The Originalist Picture. 
 
Semantic facts 
Ultimate 
constitutional 
facts
(OL)   
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Figure N: The Nonoriginalist Picture. 
 
As Figure O indicates, and as we observed before in subpart I(B), 
originalists who espouse (OL) typically see that thesis and the meanings of 
the inscriptions in the constitutional text as jointly determining the most 
fundamental constitutional facts—i.e., the norms that make up the 
Constitution.  We, on the other hand, take the norms that make up the 
Constitution, and the nonlegal facts that those norms make legally relevant, 
as the ultimate determinants of any constitutional law.  Unlike (OL) then, 
(NL) is not an ultimate determinant of the constitutional law.  Instead, as 
Figure N indicates, it can be plausibly construed as a summary of the 
penultimate constitutional facts. 
Many constitutional theorists and practicing lawyers and judges—not 
just avowed originalists but others as well—implicitly assume that the norms 
that are found in the text of the Constitution are the ultimate constitutional 
facts, and Figure O articulates that assumption.  But this is far from a non-
optional picture, and nonoriginalist conceptions of constitutional law may 
require something like what is pictured in Figure N.  Our constitutional 
practice, and the constitutional judgments that we often make, posit 
fundamental constitutional facts that “lie behind,” so to speak, the text of the 
Constitution and that are represented, implied, evidenced, or presupposed by 
that text.  David Strauss, for example, has argued, with much plausibility in 
our view, that appeals to judicial precedents are the main driving force in our 
actual constitutional argumentative practice.40  But the doctrine of precedent 
cannot be found in the text of the Constitution.  Nor, of course, is the norm or 
 
40. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 30, at 34. 
Semantic, psychological, 
precedential, sociological, 
historical, moral, and 
prudential facts 
Penultimate 
constitutional facts 
summarized by (NL) 
Ultimate 
constitutional 
facts 
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doctrine of judicial review.  The motivation to posit fundamental 
constitutional facts, including some versions of the doctrine of precedent and 
of the doctrine of judicial review, is analogous to the motivation that 
scientists have to posit fundamental laws of nature to explain and systematize 
our observations of natural phenomena, or the motivation that moral 
philosophers have to posit fundamental moral principles to justify and 
systematize our moral judgments. 
Obviously, it would take much legal and constitutional research to 
figure out which norms exactly we should posit as the most fundamental 
constitutional facts of the American legal system.  Once again, however, 
providing an accurate list of those facts is not our goal in this paper.  Instead, 
we are concerned with sketching a template of how the pluralist 
nonoriginalist conception of the constitutional law could be true, as we see a 
sore lack in the current literature of just such a template.  Let us then proffer 
the following list of the ultimate constitutional norms as illustrative of what 
the real version of such a list might look like: 
(a) In cases of first impression, if the issue in question is 
explicitly addressed by a part of the text of the 
Constitution, what is plainly said in the text is controlling. 
(b) Even in cases of first impression, the plain meaning of the 
text of the Constitution should be set aside if it conflicts 
with what historical evidence clearly indicates were the 
Founders’ shared intentions. 
(c) Legal standards that have a long history of acceptance and 
practice by courts and the society more generally have pro 
tanto legal legitimacy.  Such standards and the practices 
around them may be viewed as legally recognized 
depositories of common practical wisdom that have 
developed incrementally and have been subjected to 
repeated testing. 
(d) What is set up by the Constitution is a system of 
government in which no single branch of the government 
or a faction in the society can concentrate upon itself 
political, social, or military powers.  Power corrupts, and 
the system of government envisioned is one in which 
mutual checks and balances ward off power-induced 
corruptions as much and as long as humanly possible. 
(e) What the Constitution calls for is an economic system of 
free trade and competition that enables citizens to 
vigorously pursue economic well-being free from the 
constraints of mercantilism and other kinds of economic 
entrenchments, and to bring about thereby continuously 
improving collective well-being. 
(f) Constraints and costs imposed on individual citizens by 
laws and institutions must not violate their dignity as 
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human beings and the widest conception of autonomy that 
such dignity implies and that is compatible with citizens’ 
mutual exercises of such autonomy. 
(g) Compliance with all of the aforementioned fundamental 
norms must be pursued while maintaining collective 
survival and security. 
Although we ourselves find this list highly plausible, we reiterate that we are 
not arguing that this very list is accurate of how things actually are.  Instead, 
we are merely asserting here that something like this list could comprise the 
most fundamental constitutional norms of our system, or a significant part 
thereof.  And if that were so, then it would be quite unsurprising that (NL) is 
true.  These fundamental constitutional facts make legally relevant the 
various kinds of nonlegal facts that (NL) enumerates, including many 
nonsemantic facts, and even some normative facts.  And if the actual list 
were anything like our list, then it would not be surprising and we should 
expect that the penultimate constitutional facts are partly determined by those 
many kinds of facts, and not just semantic facts as (OL) would have it. 
B. Determinants of the Ultimate Constitutional Facts? 
As we see it, there are two main objections to the kind of picture of the 
ultimate constitutional facts and their relation to (NL) that we are sketching.  
One is the combinability problem that we shall begin to address in the next 
Part.  The other problem, which we address in the balance of this Part, could 
be formulated as follows: If the ultimate constitutional norms of our legal 
system are something like (a)–(g) that we outlined in the preceding subpart, 
what makes those norms the most fundamental constitutional norms?  To put 
it slightly differently, in virtue of what are those norms, whichever they are, 
the most fundamental constitutional norms?  Unless this question can be 
answered in a satisfactory way, the objection would continue, the relevant 
norms would be sort of left hanging in the air, and the plausibility of (NL) 
would be left largely unaccounted for. 
Many people that we have conversed with believe that something like 
this question needs to be addressed.  In fact, many contemporary legal 
theorists, both legal philosophers and jurisprudentially informed 
constitutional theorists, think that a central goal of the branch of legal 
philosophy that goes by the name “general jurisprudence” is to furnish 
answers to this question.41  The two main schools of jurisprudence in their 
 
41. See generally, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A 
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 74–102 (2001); ANDREI MARMOR, SOCIAL 
CONVENTIONS 155–75 (2009); SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 35–50 (2011); John Gardner, Law as 
a Leap of Faith, in FAITH IN LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 19 (Peter Oliver et al. eds., 2000); 
Leslie Green, Positivism and Conventionalism, 12 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 35 (1999).  These legal 
philosophers are followers of Joseph Raz, who in turn traces the problem to Hans Kelsen.  See 
generally Joseph Raz, Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm, 19 AM. J. JURIS. 94 (1974), reprinted in 
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minds are the two main camps in answering this question.  Natural law 
theorists are supposed to have taken the position that it is in virtue of some 
moral considerations or facts that particular norms or the conjunction of them 
amount to the ultimate legal norm of a legal system.  Legal positivists are 
supposed to have argued that it is in virtue of some social facts that some 
particular norms or a conjunction of them is the most fundamental norm of a 
legal system. 
We ourselves believe that the question should be taken up with extreme 
caution, for the question is an output of some much-tangled strands of 
contemporary legal philosophical thinking, and we believe that one should be 
quite suspicious of the thought that there is a genuine, nonspurious question 
in place here.  One of us has elaborated on these themes at some lengths 
elsewhere,42 and in this Article we limit ourselves to just three observations 
that we hope go some distance toward blunting the worry behind the 
question.  First, whatever bind that nonoriginalists are in by not providing an 
answer to this question is not really any worse than the bind that originalists 
are in.  On first glance, originalists may be seen to do somewhat better than 
nonoriginalists in addressing this question.  For according to them, certain 
norms are the most fundamental constitutional norms of our legal system in 
virtue of (OL) and the relevant semantic facts.  So they furnish an answer to 
the relevant question.  But any advantage that originalists may claim is quite 
negligible and short-lived, for as one of us has argued elsewhere, originalists 
have offered no persuasive story as to what makes it the case that (OL) is the 
determinant of the most fundamental of our constitutional facts.43  All of the 
proposals we are aware of that justify treating (OL) as the primary 
determinant of the ultimate constitutional facts are defective and susceptible 
to obvious counterexamples. 
Second, we are skeptical that the jurisprudential story that is most 
popular with legal theorists, both originalists and nonoriginalists—namely, 
the story that relies on H.L.A. Hart’s theory of the nature of law as laid out in 
his seminal The Concept of Law, or more precisely the orthodox 
understanding of that theory prevalent among contemporary legal 
philosophers—can furnish the help that is claimed for it.  According to the 
orthodox understanding, the norm or the conjunction of norms that is jointly 
 
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 122 (1979); Joseph Raz, Legal 
Validity, 63 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 339 (1977) [hereinafter Raz, Legal 
Validity], reprinted in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra, at 146.  There is also the Dworkinian 
tributary to the dialectic that yields the problem.  See Ronald M. Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal 
Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855 (1972) [hereinafter Dworkin, Model II], reprinted as The Model of 
Rules II, in DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 37, at 46. 
42. Kevin Toh, Jurisprudential Theories and First-Order Legal Judgments, 8 PHIL. COMPASS 
457 (2013) [hereinafter Toh, Jurisprudential Theories]; Kevin Toh, Legal Philosophy à la Carte 
(September 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Toh, Legal 
Philosophy]. 
43. Berman, supra note 18, at 59–68. 
2013] Pluralistic Nonoriginalism 1757 
 
 
 
accepted and treated as the ultimate criterion of legal validity by the officials 
of a legal system is actually the most fundamental legal norm—or what Hart 
calls the “rule of recognition” 44 —of that legal system.  This particular 
reading of Hart’s legal theory is what most legal philosophers take away 
from The Concept of Law,45 and jurisprudentially informed constitutional 
theorists have followed in the track. 46   The thought prompted by this 
understanding of Hart’s theory then is that the determinants of the ultimate 
constitutional norms are the psychological and behavioral facts that amount 
to American legal officials’ joint acceptance of those norms, or the 
conjunction of them, as the ultimate criterion of legal validity. 
There are, however, some quite significant problems for such a 
“Hartian” conception of the determinants of the ultimate constitutional 
norms.  For one thing, the prospects of making a plausible empirical case that 
a particular set of norms is commonly accepted by the legal officials of the 
 
44. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100 (3d ed. 2012). 
45. For example, Scott Shapiro, in his recent book Legality, says: 
[I]f Hart is correct, and social practices explain how legal systems are possible, then 
legal reasoning must always be traceable to a social rule of recognition.  Arguments 
about who has authority to do what, what rights individuals have, which legal texts are 
authoritative, and the proper way to interpret them must ultimately be resolved by 
reference to the sociological facts of official practice. 
SHAPIRO, supra note 41, at 102.  This typical construal of Hart’s theory began with Dworkin’s 
influential articles in the 1960s and 1970s.  See generally Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 14 (1967) [hereinafter Dworkin, Model I], reprinted as The Model of Rules I, in TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 37, at 14; Dworkin, Model II, supra note 41.  While many have 
come to look askance at other parts of Dworkin’s arguments, this take on Hart’s theory has pretty 
much stuck.  See, e.g., Raz, Legal Validity, supra note 41, at 150–51; Eugenio Bulygin, Sobre La 
Regla De RECONOCIMIENTO, in DERECHO, FILOSOFÍA Y LENGUAJE: HOMENAJE A AMBROSIO L. 
GIOJA 31 (1976), reprinted in ANÁLISIS LÓGICO Y DERECHO 383, 385–86 (1991); Jules L. Coleman 
& Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 
241, 246 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996); Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1222 (2009) [hereinafter Leiter, Theoretical Disagreement]; Gerald J. Postema, 
Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 166–72 (1982); 
Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Jan. 3, 2003), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism. 
46. See, for example, the articles collected in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009).  Fallon for one has relied 
on Hart’s theory, as outlined above, to accuse originalists of an “implicit jurisprudential mistake in 
failing to acknowledge that the foundations of law lie in current practices of acceptance.” 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Precedent-Based Constitutional Adjudication, Acceptance, and the Rule of 
Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra, at 47, 64 
[hereinafter Fallon, Precedent]; cf. Fallon, supra note 28, at 1213.  He explains that “the fact that a 
[constitutional] provision was once intended or understood to have future binding force cannot 
suffice to make that provision law today unless a current rule or practice of recognition gives that 
intent or understanding legally controlling force.”  Fallon, Precedent, supra, at 52.  For an argument 
for originalism that relies on this orthodox understanding of Hart’s theory, see Lawrence B. Solum, 
District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 954 (2009).  One 
constitutional theorist has tried to “operationalize” Hart’s theory, thus understood, by trying to 
ascertain exactly which group of people’s practices determines our constitutional law.  See 
generally Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose 
Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719 (2006). 
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American legal system as the ultimate criterion of legal validity of their 
community are rather dim.  Of course, some extensive empirical studies 
would be required to substantiate any position on this issue.  But as Dworkin 
has consistently argued over the years, and as Fallon agrees, at least the 
initial overwhelming appearance is that the American constitutional practice 
is marked by controversies and disagreements about what the constitutional 
law consists of, and not by any marked agreement or consensus.47  Even if 
some broad agreement or consensus could be discerned, the agreement or 
consensus would not be sufficiently thorough or fine-grained to yield a set of 
complex norms of the sort that we would need.48 
More importantly, as Dworkin has also pointed out, and as the two of us 
have argued separately elsewhere, the Hartian approach taken here matches 
neither our phenomenology when we make legal or constitutional judgments, 
nor the observed sociology of our practice of making legal and constitutional 
judgments.49  The fact is that the lack of official consensus about the ultimate 
 
 47. See generally DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 37, at 1–86, 355–99; Dworkin, Model I, 
supra note 45; Fallon, supra note 28, at 1231–37. 
48. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, in THE RULE OF 
RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, at 2, 2–3, 42–43 (applying Hart’s 
theory to the United States and questioning his notion that the ultimate rule of recognition will allow 
for clear identification of what counts as law and easy prediction of legal outcomes).  While 
agreeing with Dworkin’s initial point that mature and thriving legal systems may not include official 
consensuses about the ultimate criteria of legal validity, Fallon has recently held out hope that some 
further psychological facts, namely the facts about judges’ broadly shared dispositions about how to 
decide cases, could be relied upon to identify the rule of recognition of the American legal system: 
[R]eferences to the rule or rules of recognition mark the existence of broadly shared, 
often tacit understandings on the part of those at the center of constitutional practice 
(most notably Supreme Court Justices and judges, but also other[] [officials] . . .) about 
how to “go on” in ways that will be acknowledged by others as appropriate or correct. 
Fallon, Precedent, supra note 46, at 56.  We do not, however, think that this is a very promising 
way to go.  The fact is that the totality of a population’s dispositions is limited and finite, whereas 
there are an unlimited number of potential legal controversies, including controversies about the 
ultimate determinants of the constitutional law, in which judges would have to make decisions that 
outstrip the existing dispositions of the relevant population.  In fact, appealing to judges’ 
dispositions does not appear to settle the debate about what the constitutional law consists of.  
Fallon appeals to Wittgenstein’s celebrated discussion of rule-following to buttress his position just 
described.  Id. at 56 & n.46.  In one of the most influential commentaries on Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of rule-following, however, Saul Kripke has forcefully argued against the view that the 
facts of a person or population’s psychological dispositions can be appealed to to distinguish correct 
extrapolations of a rule from incorrect ones.  See SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND 
PRIVATE LANGUAGE: AN ELEMENTARY EXPOSITION (1982).  And Kripke’s reasoning is partly 
based on the point that we have just made—i.e., that the totality of a person or population’s 
disposition is finite, whereas there is no limit to the applicability of rules.  See id. at 22–37. 
49. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Theory and the Rule of Recognition: Toward a 
Fourth Theory of Law, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, 
at 269; Kevin Toh, The Predication Thesis and a New Problem about Persistent Fundamental Legal 
Controversies, 22 UTILITAS 331 (2010) [hereinafter Toh, The Predication Thesis].  Although we 
agree on this broad point, neither of us agrees with all the details of the other’s exposition of this 
point.  One of us has also argued extensively elsewhere that the supposedly Hartian approach that 
we have outlined in the text is not really Hart’s, and that Hart’s real position is quite compatible 
with both the observation that a legal system may be marked with controversies about the ultimate 
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criterion of legal validity does not detract from judges’ or anyone else’s 
sense of entitlement to make judgments about what the constitutional law 
consists of that they deem correct.  For example, Justice Scalia knows that 
there is no common acceptance of any originalist standard of constitutional 
interpretation, 50  and in any case would not abandon his commitment to 
originalism even if a thorough sociological study were to show that there is 
no such common acceptance.  And even if a consensus among the officials 
about the ultimate criterion of legal validity were to exist in our community, 
judges and others would not feel that the question of what the ultimate 
criterion of legal validity in our legal system is is a closed question.  We 
would not think that a judge or anyone else is making a legal or 
constitutional mistake merely because he is flouting the prevailing consensus 
about the ultimate criterion of legal validity.51  Simply put, we do not think, 
and our practice does not display our commitment to the idea, that the real 
ultimate determinant of our constitutional law is the official consensus or 
agreement. 
Third, and most important, in our opinion, there is no happy or 
unproblematic version of the question about the determinants of the ultimate 
constitutional norms.  Let us explain.52  The question, once again, could be 
formulated as: 
(Q0) What makes it the case that some norms are the ultimate 
constitutional norms of our legal system? 
Or, put another way: 
(Q0') In virtue of what are certain norms the ultimate 
constitutional norms of our legal system? 
What exactly is being asked by these questions?  There are multiple 
possibilities, none quite satisfactory.  The question could be conceived as an 
 
criteria of legal validity among its officials and members, and the phenomenological cum 
sociological point about our legal and constitutional judgments.  See Kevin Toh, Hart’s 
Expressivism and His Benthamite Project, 11 LEGAL THEORY 75 (2005); Toh, The Predication 
Thesis, supra; Toh, Legal Philosophy, supra note 42.  Thus, the quotation marks around the term 
“Hartian” when used in the text above. 
50. See Scalia, supra note 3, at 852 (observing that “originalism is not, and had perhaps never 
been, the sole method of constitutional exegesis”); SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 38 
(“The ascendant school of constitutional interpretation affirms the existence of [‘]The Living 
Constitution[’], a body of law that . . . grows and changes from age to age, in order to meet the 
needs of a changing society.  And it is the judges who determine those needs and ‘find’ that 
changing law.”). 
51. Brian Leiter has asserted that a judge who does so would be making a mistake—viz., a 
jurisprudential mistake stemming from his jurisprudential ignorance.  See Leiter, Theoretical 
Disagreement, supra note 45.  We do not share this diagnosis. 
52. The way that we defuse the relevant question in what follows is the way we believe that we 
should defuse what Shapiro calls “the Possibility Puzzle,” which is the motivating puzzle of his 
arguments in Legality.  See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 41, at 35–50, 79–117. 
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empirical one about etiology and could be formulated as one of the 
following: 
(Q1) What caused a particular set of norms to come to be 
treated as the ultimate constitutional norms of the 
American legal system? 
(Q1') What causes a particular set of norms to be treated as the 
ultimate constitutional norms of the American legal 
system? 
But this cannot really be the crucial question.  There is nothing really 
puzzling about such empirical questions.  We, or the specialists among us, 
should be able to gather the pertinent historical, anthropological, 
sociological, and psychological evidence to answer such questions. 
Alternatively, the question could be conceived as a particular 
metaphysical question as follows: 
(Q2) What facts constitute or amount to our community’s 
treating a particular set of norms as the ultimate 
constitutional norms of the American legal system? 
Here, there is a philosophical problem, and it is actually to this question that 
Hart provided an answer in terms of officials’ shared acceptance of a set of 
norms.  The mistake that the orthodox understanding of Hart’s legal theory 
makes is to conflate this question with a slightly different question that (Q0) 
or (Q0') could be construed as raising.  Notice that as an answer to (Q2), as 
we believe that it was meant to be, Hart’s proposal is a cogent and forceful 
answer that has hardly been bettered.53  And it is not really vulnerable to the 
Dworkinian worries that we outlined above.  It is only when (Q0) or (Q0') is 
construed as a question about the determinants of our ultimate constitutional 
norms, not as a question about the determinants of the psychological 
phenomenon of treating certain norms as the ultimate constitutional norms, 
that Hart’s proposal is vulnerable to those worries.  This is a clear indication 
that (Q2) is not really the right version of the relevant question.  And if, 
 
53. In case the reader thinks that there is really no difference between (Q0) and (Q0') on the one 
hand and (Q2) on the other, think of the moral analogues of these several questions.  The difference 
between the questions is much more obvious in the moral context, and that enables us to see the 
distinction more clearly in the legal context as well.  It may be argued, however, that in the legal 
context, the whole raison d’être of legal positivism is to collapse the distinction between these two 
sets of issues and questions.  We are suspicious of that line of thinking, however.  Hart is the 
paradigmatic legal positivist of recent times, and he sought to clearly mark the distinction between 
the two sets of issues and questions by his famous distinction between internal and external legal 
statements.  See HART, supra note 44, at vi, 88–89, 102–05, 291; see also Eugenio Bulygin, Norms, 
Normative Propositions, and Legal Statements, in 3 CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY: A NEW 
SURVEY 127, 136 (Guttorm Fløistad ed., 1982).  Unfortunately, that distinction has been all but 
overlooked in recent years, much to the detriment of recent legal philosophical thinking.  One of us 
has argued against what he considers inadequate arguments by Joseph Raz for overlooking the 
distinction.  See Kevin Toh, Raz on Detachment, Acceptance and Describability, 27 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 403 (2007). 
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contrary to what we have just argued, the relevant question were (Q2), then 
we have a ready answer in Hart’s proposal. 
Perhaps the relevant question is not an empirical or metaphysical 
question of the preceding sorts, but is instead a first-order legal question.  In 
that case, it could be formulated as: 
(Q3) What legally validates certain norms as the ultimate 
constitutional norms of the American legal system? 
But notice that if we take seriously the functional role of the norms like (a)–
(g) as the ultimate constitutional norms, then (Q3) cannot be taken as a 
genuine, nonspurious question.  Such norms are supposed to be the ultimate 
legal norms in the American legal system, and that means that there cannot 
be a set of facts or considerations that legally validates those norms as the 
ultimate constitutional norms of the American legal system.54 
 Finally, the question could be construed as one of the following moral or 
all-things-considered normative questions: 
(Q4) What makes it the case that we have reasons to comply 
with the ultimate constitutional norms of the American 
legal system? 
(Q5) What makes it the case that we have duties or obligations to 
comply with the ultimate constitutional norms of the 
American legal system? 
Despite the fact that many legal philosophers have assumed that an adequate 
conception of the ultimate norms of legal systems must answer such 
normative questions, 55  there is no good ground for the presumption that 
ultimate legal norms must be justifiable, morally or all things considered, for 
them to qualify as the ultimate legal norms.56  It follows that our conception 
of certain norms as the ultimate legal norms of the American legal system is 
not held hostage by the possibility of providing satisfactory answers to (Q4) 
or (Q5). 
It follows that none of (Q1)–(Q5) could be thought the right construal of 
the crucial question we began with.  And once we exclude these versions of 
the question, it is not clear that there is any genuine, nonspurious question 
 
54. On this point, as applied to Hartian rules of recognition, Raz, for one, has vacillated.  Some-
times, he seems to say that a rule of recognition is legally validated by its being accepted and 
followed by legal officials as the ultimate legal norm; at others, he asserts that it is a mistake to talk 
about the legal validity of a rule of recognition.  Compare, e.g., Raz, Legal Validity, supra note 41, 
at 150–51, with Joseph Raz, Postema on Law’s Autonomy and Public Practical Reasons: A Critical 
Comment, 4 LEGAL THEORY 1 (1998), reprinted in BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION 
373, 381 (2009). 
55. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS AND NORMS 49–58 (Princeton Univ. Press 
1990) (1975); Dworkin, Model II, supra note 41, at 48–58; Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and 
Convention at the Foundations of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 171 (1982). 
56. For a set of compelling arguments to this effect, see David Enoch, Reason-Giving and the 
Law, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1 (2011). 
1762 Texas Law Review [Vol. 91:1739 
 
 
left to be asked.  Social scientists can worry about (Q1), legal philosophers 
about (Q2), lawyers and judges among us about (Q3), and moral and political 
philosophers about (Q4) and (Q5).  But there is no further question of similar 
shape or wording, as far as we can determine, that we need to have answered 
in order for us to deem it a strong and nonproblematic possibility that there is 
some set of norms such as (a)–(g) that are the ultimate constitutional norms 
of the American legal system, and that (NL) is an accurate summary of the 
penultimate constitutional facts that such ultimate constitutional norms 
determine along with the various kinds of nonlegal facts that they make 
legally relevant.  Of course, as Figure O in subpart A of this Part indicates, 
originalists believe that there are determinants of the ultimate constitutional 
facts—namely, (OL) and the semantic facts that (OL) makes relevant.  But 
the important point here is that the lack of any such determining facts for the 
ultimate constitutional facts is not worrisome.  It is perfectly sensible to think 
that the ultimate determinants of our constitutional facts are the ultimate 
constitutional norms and not something else that determines those ultimate 
constitutional facts.57 
Some of our readers may retain a nagging sense that there is some 
genuine or nonspurious question which is a version of (Q0) and (Q0'), and 
which is not covered by any of our (Q1)–(Q5).  To such readers, we simply 
issue a challenge: Try to come up with a formulation of a question that we 
must answer with respect to a set of purported ultimate legal norms of a legal 
system—a question which is not covered by our (Q1)–(Q5).  Our current 
diagnosis is that any nagging sense results from a conflation of the several 
questions that we have disambiguated.  But we would be happy to be 
surprised. 
III. The Combinability Problem 
No nonoriginalist says that meanings of constitutional inscriptions are 
irrelevant to constitutional interpretation.  Instead, nonoriginalists argue that 
facts or considerations other than such semantic facts are legitimate inputs 
 
57. Here, our position is analogous to that of Paul Horwich, who has argued that the ultimate 
epistemic norms, such as that of modus ponens, are the ultimate determinants of epistemic 
justification and that it is a mistake to seek further justification of such norms.  See generally PAUL 
HORWICH, Meaning Constitution and Epistemic Rationality, in REFLECTIONS ON MEANING 134 
(2005) [hereinafter HORWICH, Meaning Constitution]; Paul Horwich, Ungrounded Reason, 105 J. 
PHIL. 453 (2008), reprinted in TRUTH-MEANING-REALITY 197 (2010).  Horwich’s arguments are 
reactions to some philosophers who have argued that fundamental epistemic norms (e.g., the norm 
of modus ponens) are justified by the rules that are constitutive of certain concepts (e.g., the rules 
that are constitutive of the logical connective “if . . . then . . .”).  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER 
PEACOCKE, A STUDY OF CONCEPTS (1992); Paul Boghossian, How Are Objective Epistemic 
Reasons Possible?, 106 PHIL. STUD. 1 (2001); Paul Boghossian, Knowledge of Logic, in NEW 
ESSAYS ON THE A PRIORI 229 (Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke eds., 2000).  Such 
proposals for “semantogenetic justification,” as Horwich dubs them, HORWICH, Meaning 
Constitution, supra, at 136, of our fundamental epistemic norms bear at least some superficial 
resemblance to the originalist picture summed up in Figure O. 
2013] Pluralistic Nonoriginalism 1763 
 
 
 
for constitutional interpretation.  And as the above-mentioned lists of Bobbitt 
and Fallon indicate, nonoriginalists typically include psychological, 
historical, structural, doctrinal, and normative considerations among the 
nonsemantic considerations that are legitimate grounds of constitutional 
interpretation. 58   Some have argued that such a “pluralist” approach to 
constitutional interpretation is inherently unstable, if not downright 
incoherent or impossible, because it is difficult or even impossible to 
combine different types of considerations.  It is to this “combinability 
problem,” or the various versions it could take, that we now turn.  This is the 
second of the two main objections to our picture of pluralistic nonoriginalism 
that we address in this Article. 
No legal theorist has been as forthright and unqualified in his assertion 
of the combinability problem as Larry Alexander.  In the most extensive of 
his discussions of this problem that we are aware of, and speaking of legal 
interpretation in general, Alexander says: 
  There are some theories of interpretation that not only require a 
combination of different empirical inquiries or of empirical and moral 
inquiries, but also require that the results of those different inquiries 
be “blended” to arrive at the authoritative meaning of the legal norm.  
For example, some theorists argue that the meaning of a statute is a 
product of its text, its authorial intentions, its past judicial 
interpretations, and what is good and just.  Moreover, these different 
factors are not arranged in some clear lexical order—with text 
constraining intentions and both constrained by justice, for example—
but rather are factors to be mixed together in some interpretive stew. 
  How is the legal interpreter to ascertain the meaning rendered up 
by such a nonstructured combination of different inquiries and types 
of reasoning?  It is here that some special faculty, the ability to engage 
in what some call “practical reason,” enters the picture.  We grasp the 
meaning of a posited legal norm through practical reasoning in light of 
text, authorial intentions, history, and morality. . . . 
  I have written elsewhere on why I think the claims on behalf of 
such practical reason are hogwash.  No one—not even lawyers—can 
meaningfully “combine” fact and value, or facts of different types, 
except lexically in the manner I described above.  Any non-lexical 
“combining” of text and intentions, text and justice, and so forth is just 
incoherent, like combining pi, green, and the Civil War.  There is no 
process of reasoning that can derive meaning from such 
combinations.59 
 
58. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
59. Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 517, 521 
(1998) (footnotes omitted). 
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This is strong stuff, and we suspect that not all legal theorists who believe 
that nonoriginalists suffer from a combinability problem will want to sign on 
to every aspect of Alexander’s exposition.  But the suspicion that there is 
such a combinability problem seems quite widespread.  Fallon, who is a 
nonoriginalist, takes the problem seriously enough to consider it one of the 
most important and pressing problems in constitutional law60 and to propose 
a solution to it in a long article.  Listing the different kinds of constitutional 
argument that we have already listed above in subpart I(C), Fallon says that 
the problem, which he calls “the commensurability problem,” “is to show 
how arguments of all of these various kinds fit together in a single, coherent 
constitutional calculus,” and he says that difficult constitutional cases cannot 
be resolved without solving the problem.61 
Despite these statements of the problem, however, we are not at all sure 
about its nature and contours.  The following subparts of this Part and the 
first subpart of Part IV try out different interpretations of the problem and try 
to settle on a version that makes best sense of what constitutional theorists 
like Alexander and Fallon may be getting at. 
A. Moral–Political and Epistemological Versions 
Let us first quickly set aside two versions of the combinability problem 
that plainly should not bother or detain us for long.  The first of the two is the 
version that is familiar as an objection to Bobbitt’s work on constitutional 
interpretation.  When Bobbitt introduced his six modalities of constitutional 
argument in his 1982 book, Constitutional Fate, many critics took issue with 
his failure to provide any meta-rule or other guidance regarding what judges 
should do to address any legal indeterminacies that would obtain when the 
modalities point in different directions.62  This is a supposed defect that 
Bobbitt claimed as a virtue in his 1991 follow-up volume, Constitutional 
Interpretation. 63   In that later work, he argued that a choice among the 
outcomes that each modality “legitimates” can only be effectuated by a 
“recursion to conscience,” and that the need for conscientious choice, far 
 
60. Fallon, supra note 28, at 1191. 
61. Id. at 1189–92; see also, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive 
Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1787 (1997) (“Because 
multiple sources will sometimes give rise to conflicting and incommensurate arguments, . . . an 
eclectic theory would appear to require some metaprinciple that mediates among conflicts between 
different kinds of arguments.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of 
Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 295 (2005) (criticizing Fallon’s inclusion of precedent in his 
interpretive method because the consideration of multiple sources of constitutional meaning creates 
the need for a system of rules about the priority of the various modalities). 
62. See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Constitutional Judgment, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1111 (1993) 
(“Despite the clear power of Constitutional Fate, critics identified [some] substantial 
shortcomings. . . .  [P]erhaps mo[st] troubling, Constitutional Fate presented no methodology for 
decisionmaking when conflicts between the various modes of argument arise.  It was, therefore, 
massively indeterminate.”). 
63. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 27, at 31–42. 
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from undermining the moral justifiability of a system of constitutional 
governance complete with judicial review, supplies the requisite 
justification.64  As Bobbitt put it: 
The US Constitution engages our moral sensibilities by 
the clash of its interpretive modalities, which require the moral 
instance of our judgment.  The justice of the system lies in the 
extent to which it is able to confer legitimacy on the right moral 
actions of its deciders.  It is thus the very fact that legitimate 
rationales do conflict that enables justice to be done.65 
Many readers deemed this an inadequate solution and argued that judicial 
choice among practice-legitimated outcomes, unconstrained by law, 
exacerbates countermajoritarian objections to judicial review and therefore 
fails to provide moral justification for the practice.66 
For our purposes, the important thing to recognize about this particular 
running of the debate—which we have, of course, ruthlessly simplified—is 
that those who insisted that Bobbitt’s multimodal account required a meta-
rule did not charge that combining or integrating the diverse modalities is 
impossible.  Instead, they charged that insofar as the independent modalities, 
or their outputs, necessitated the exercise of conscientious choice, they 
deliver a practice of judicial review that fails some test of political justice.67  
We ourselves are not moved by that particular objection.  In broad outline, 
we believe that the standard responses to the countermajoritarian objection to 
judicial review68 are adequate to justify the American practice of it, even to 
the extent that unelected judges appeal to many kinds of considerations and 
do not rely on a meta-rule that would adjudicate among them.  Whether we 
are right about that or not, the combinability problem that interests us for 
now and that Larry Alexander’s arguments invoke is one that charges 
pluralism with incoherence or a like defect, and not with violating claimed 
principles of political morality. 
Another version of the combinability problem that can be rather quickly 
dispatched is the one that construes it as an epistemological problem.  
Fallon’s talk of the need for the different types of constitutional arguments to 
fit together into a single calculus possibly indicates his view that there is a 
problem of combining different types of evidence in investigations aimed at 
 
64. Id. at 184. 
65. Id. at 170. 
66. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Constitutional Investigations, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 1731, 1741 
(1994) (identifying without endorsing this line of criticism). 
67. Id. 
68. See generally, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 
(1981), reprinted in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33 (1985); Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: 
Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381 (1992), reprinted as What the 
Constitution Says, in RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 72 (1996).  And for Bobbitt’s own response, see Philip Bobbitt, 
Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 1869 (1994). 
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gaining access to constitutional facts.69  And some of what Alexander says in 
the long passage we quoted above70 suggests that he is invoking the same 
epistemological problem, although in his correspondence with us he has 
explicitly disavowed this version of the combinability problem.  In any case, 
the problem, as so construed, lacks substance.  Paleontologists, for example, 
have no problem combining different types of evidence—the shape and size 
of the fossils, the information from carbon dating, the surrounding geological 
formations, accumulated evidence about the location’s environment in 
different time periods, well-confirmed zoological theories about the present-
day organisms that might have descended from older organisms, etc.—in 
determining the nature of the organism whose fossils they are studying.  And 
physicians have no problem combining different types of evidence—the 
patient’s particular symptoms, the past treatment history, the patient’s travel 
history, prevailing medical theories about various maladies, etc.—when they 
diagnose a patient.  In our attempts to find out what is the case, we routinely 
seek hypotheses that would best explain many different kinds of available 
evidence, and we see no reason to think that such inference patterns are 
inappropriate or especially problematic in legal or constitutional 
investigations. 
A judge who really is unable to proceed in the absence of a decision 
procedure or calculus that sets out how the different types of evidence are to 
be combined would be a victim of a serious cognitive impairment.  The 
decision procedures of the sort that legal theorists like Alexander and Fallon 
could be read as hankering after are not only an epistemological chimera but 
also wholly unnecessary for conducting our epistemic lives.  If anything, the 
thought that such procedures are necessary would hamper our inquiries.  Our 
epistemic lives can be difficult enough without putting artificial and 
unnecessary straitjackets on our thinking, and the decision procedures in 
question would be such straitjackets. 
B. The Metaphysical Version—I 
As the third paragraph of the long quoted passage at the beginning of 
this Part indicates, Alexander seems to think that there is a general 
metaphysical problem with combining facts and norms, or facts of different 
varieties.  In the “elsewhere” that the first sentence of that paragraph refers 
to, after noticing that some legal theorists conceive statutory interpretation as 
a form of practical reasoning that takes into account normative 
considerations, Alexander helpfully distinguishes the metaphysical (or 
“ontological” in his terminology) issue from the epistemological one.71  He 
concentrates on the former, and asks: 
 
69. See Fallon, supra note 28, at 1189–92. 
70. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
71. See Larry Alexander, Practical Reason and Statutory Interpretation, 12 LAW & PHIL. 319 
(1993). 
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[M]y second question . . . [is] how normative and factual are supposed 
to blend.  If the practical reason approach to statutes is supposed to tell 
us what statutes “are”, then why isn’t the metaphysical mixing of 
norm and fact—of, say, what is just and what someone said or thought 
at a particular time or place—incomprehensible, somewhat like 
mixing “pi, green, and the Civil War”?72 
Alexander’s metaphysical objection here is no easier to understand than the 
epistemological version of the combinability problem, and his explanation of 
the objection in the passages subsequent to the just-quoted passage, and his 
citations, indicate that the objection most likely stems from incomplete and 
wayward understandings of some philosophical issues.  But the metaphysical 
version is the one that Alexander has reaffirmed in his communication with 
us, and for this reason we dwell on it at a greater length. 
Before we get to the philosophical issues just mentioned, notice that the 
kind of blending of the factual and the normative that Alexander deems 
impossible and incomprehensible is very much unremarkable and 
commonplace.  For example, the fact that a particular thing is a weed consists 
of the fact that the thing has a biological makeup of a plant and the fact that it 
is undesirable in gardens.  Analogous things can be said about the fact that 
some person is cowardly, 73  the fact that some musical performance is 
pedestrian, etc.  Far from treating combinations of facts and norms as 
problematic, there is a minor cottage industry in contemporary Anglo-
American philosophy of exploring the facts or statuses that are partly factual 
and partly normative, and the concepts—the so-called thick concepts—which 
we deploy to think and talk about such facts and statuses.  In fact, some 
philosophers have gone to some lengths to deny that the factual and 
normative components of the relevant facts are separable or detachable from 
each other, not that they cannot be combined.74  If, as Alexander asserts, 
blending of norms and facts were impossible and incomprehensible, then 
much of our social world, including our moral and legal worlds, would be ill-
founded and incomprehensible. 
Alexander’s talk of “lexical order[ing]”75 may indicate his willingness 
to countenance what could be described as “structured” blended facts—i.e., 
the facts in which the different constituents, both normative and non-
normative, are cleanly ordered in particular ways.  Perhaps the worry then is 
that the kind of blended facts that pluralist nonoriginalism envisions are a lot 
 
72. Id. at 322. 
73. BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 140–41 (1985). 
74. See, e.g., id. at 132–55; John McDowell, Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, in WITT-
GENSTEIN: TO FOLLOW A RULE 141 (Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich eds., 1981).  For 
a proposal to construe our legal concepts as thick concepts, see David Enoch & Kevin Toh, Legal as 
a Thick Concept, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURE OF LAW 257 (Wil Waluchow 
& Stefan Sciaraffa eds., 2013). 
75. Alexander, supra note 59. 
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“messier.”  We are not sure that all of the blended facts that we discussed 
above have the kind of neatness that would be provided by a lexical ordering.  
But there are even clearer examples to undercut this particular strand of the 
worry.  Think, for example, of what it takes for an organism to be healthy.  
To be healthy, an organism must have a number of different properties many 
of which are “contingently clustered,” to borrow the philosopher of science 
Richard Boyd’s terminology.76  These properties are likely to include bodily 
integrity, resistance to diseases, a certain level of psychic well-being, 
disposition to longevity, ability to reproduce, etc.  Such properties are 
contingently clustered in the sense that in at least certain conditions, they 
tend to co-occur in nature because the existence of some of the properties, 
through various causal mechanisms, reinforces the existence of other 
properties in the set.  Boyd calls such clusters of properties “homeostatic 
cluster[s]” and argues that they are ubiquitous in nature.77  Think of what it 
takes for a piece of land to be arable, what it takes for an animal to be 
domesticated, what it takes for a tune to be catchy or hooky, etc.  All of these 
higher-order properties, we conjecture, could be conceived as homeostatic 
clusters in Boyd’s sense.  At least some of the properties in any such cluster 
would be unnecessary for the existence of the cluster; and it would be unclear 
which collections of the relevant properties would be sufficient for the 
existence of the cluster.  There appears then to be no problem with “messy” 
blended facts that do not consist of any neat necessary and sufficient 
constituent facts. 
It may also be worth pointing out that the particular example that 
Alexander has repeatedly brought up—namely, the allegedly impossible and 
nonsensical blending of pi, green, and the Civil War—is not a problem.  It is 
quite easy to think of such a blending.  Imagine a Civil War monument that 
consists of a sculpture in the middle of a circular green field.  Here, we 
would have a fact that unproblematically combines pi, green, and the Civil 
War.  Such a Civil War monument may not be actual, but it certainly is 
metaphysically possible.78 
 
76. Richard N. Boyd, How to Be a Moral Realist, in ESSAYS ON MORAL REALISM 181, 197–98 
(Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988). 
77. Id. at 196–97. 
78. Sometimes, Alexander has extended his list and talked about the supposed impossibility of 
combining pi, green, the Civil War, and the categorical imperative.  LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY 
SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING 214 (2008).  We can then imagine a monument of 
the above description that was built using labor practices that complied with the categorical 
imperative.  With or without the categorical imperative, we anticipate that some readers will feel 
that these proposed counterexamples to Alexander’s slogan are a trick and that they do not really 
threaten the particular manner in which pi, green, and the Civil War—and the varied factual and 
normative considerations that pluralism invokes—are supposed to be uncombinable.  That is 
certainly possible.  We hope, then, that our proposed counterexamples will spur Alexander or like-
minded critics to explicate the nature of alleged uncombinability more precisely. 
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C. The Metaphysical Version—II 
Let us now turn to the philosophical themes that seem to be at least 
partly motivating or buttressing Alexander’s line of thinking.  We believe 
that we can further undermine that line by exposing what we suspect are 
confusions about these themes.  Right after the passage we quoted at the 
beginning of the last subpart, Alexander says: 
At least since Hume, philosophers have been wary of ontologically 
mixing the normative and the factual.  And some have been skeptical 
about the existence of any normative ontological realm that is not 
completely reducible to the factual.  For instance, John Mackie 
thought that moral realism requires “queer” metaphysical entities.  
Even if we can give a satisfactory non-reductionist account of moral 
ontology, however, are not the moral–factual blends that ontological 
practical reason refers to vastly more queer?79 
A lot is tangled in this short passage, but once untangled the philosophical 
issues that Alexander is referring to do not in any way question the status of 
blended facts the way that he appears to be thinking. 
To begin, Alexander is quite right that J.L. Mackie, in the introductory 
chapter of his book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, questioned the reality 
of moral facts that our moral discourse posits, and called them 
metaphysically “queer,” because our cognition of them is supposed to have 
noncontingent influence on our wills and action.80  Mackie averred that no 
other facts we posit in our explanations of the world are like that and that we 
should be extremely wary of positing such sui generis facts.  There are three 
standard responses to Mackie’s queerness argument in the philosophical 
literature: (i) some have argued that moral facts do not actually have the kind 
of noncontingent connection to our will and action, and that they are just 
natural facts quite like other kinds of facts that we posit in our natural and 
social sciences, which have only contingent connections to our will and 
action;81 (ii) some have agreed with Mackie that moral facts, if they existed, 
would be queer, but that our moral discourse is better conceived as a non-
fact-positing discourse like our imperatival discourse;82 and (iii) some have 
argued that moral facts do have the kind of noncontingent sway on our wills 
 
79. Alexander, supra note 71, at 322 (citations omitted). 
80. See J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 15–49 (1977). 
81. See generally, e.g., FRANK JACKSON, FROM METAPHYSICS TO ETHICS 113–38 (1998); 
Boyd, supra note 76; Peter Railton, Moral Realism, 95 PHIL. REV. 163 (1986); Nicholas L. 
Sturgeon, Moral Explanations, in MORALITY, REASON AND TRUTH 49 (David Copp & David 
Zimmerman eds., 1984).  
82. See generally, e.g., A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 104–26 (Penguin Books 
2001) (1936); R.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1952); Charles Leslie Stevenson, The 
Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, 46 MIND 14 (1937).  These are works by the authors that 
Alexander cites in his footnote 7, which is attached to the second of the sentences quoted in the text.  
Alexander, supra note 71, at 322 n.7. 
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and actions, but still that we should not refrain from positing them for they 
are nonoptional for our moral thinking and discourse, and further that there 
are plenty of other seemingly strange facts we posit in our thinking, such as 
sets in mathematical thinking, possible worlds in counterfactual thinking, and 
the myriad of astounders we posit in quantum mechanics.83 
An important point here is that even if moral facts were problematically 
queer, blended facts would be no more problematically queer than the simple 
unblended moral facts.  What makes moral facts queer, according to Mackie, 
is that they have noncontingent influence on our wills and action.  Blended 
facts are not different in this regard.  The fact that a particular action would 
be cowardly—i.e., a blended fact—generates reasons for us to refrain from 
engaging in such an action.  This noncontingent relation between a blended 
fact and the reasons we have to act in a particular way could be considered 
queer, but it is no queerer than the similar relation between, say, the fact that 
a particular action would be wrong—i.e., a simple, nonblended normative 
fact—and the fact that we ought not to engage in that action.  A second, more 
important point is that we cannot merely stop with the conclusion that moral 
facts are queer and that we ought not to posit them in our moral thinking 
unless we cease moral thinking altogether.  We need to opt for one of the 
standard options, or some other option that has so far been overlooked by 
philosophers, or at least think that an option, whichever it is, is satisfactory.  
Mackie himself, later in his book, flirts with the second “nonfactualist” or 
“noncognitivist” option. 84   Since Alexander does not refrain from moral 
thought and talk,85 he supposedly thinks that one of the options, even if he 
himself has not identified it, is available.  But if we opted for one of the 
options, then with that option, moral facts, or normative facts more generally, 
would not be problematically queer.  Moreover, since, as we have observed 
already, blended facts are no queerer than simple normative facts, blended 
facts would not be problematically queer either.  In sum, Mackie and similar-
minded philosophers give no support to Alexander’s claim that blended facts 
are metaphysically problematic and that philosophers have been treating 
them as such.  Arguably, Alexander would be entitled to appeal to Mackie 
and similar-minded philosophers to substantiate his claim if he himself 
refrained from normative thought and talk, but that is not the case. 
Alexander also thinks that Hume can be a source for his metaphysical 
qualms about blended facts.  We can think of two philosophical themes that 
Hume is often associated with that Alexander may be thinking of.  The first 
is the so-called Hume’s law, according to which a normative conclusion 
 
83. See generally, e.g., DAVID ENOCH, TAKING MORALITY SERIOUSLY: A DEFENSE OF RO-
BUST REALISM (2011); RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU, MORAL REALISM: A DEFENCE (2007); RALPH 
WEDGWOOD, THE NATURE OF NORMATIVITY (2007). 
84. MACKIE, supra note 80, at 50–63. 
85. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Academic Freedom, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 883 (2006). 
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cannot be inferred from purely factual premises alone.86  Notice that in a 
practical syllogism like the following: 
(6)  One ought to maximize prospects of happiness. 
(7) Among the available options, φ-ing would maximize the 
prospect of happiness. 
________________________________________________________ 
(8)  One ought to φ. 
a normative conclusion (8) is inferred from a normative premise (6) and a 
descriptive or factual premise (7).  Hume’s law says that derivations of 
normative conclusions like (8) would be illicit if the set of premises 
contained only descriptive or factual premises.  Whether this is right, or 
whether it should really be attributed to Hume, is immaterial.  What should 
be noticed is that there is nothing here about the problematic nature of 
blended facts.  In fact, here, we can think of (8) as representing a blended 
fact that consists of the normative fact represented by (6) and the descriptive 
fact represented by (7). 
A second Humean theme that we can think of has to do with Hume’s 
emphasis on the distinction between cognitive psychological attitudes like 
belief on the one hand and conative psychological attitudes like desire on the 
other. 87   In contemporary terminology, these two sets of attitudes are 
“modally” separable.88  A belief that P differs from a desire that P in that the 
two react differently to an indication that not-P is the case.  Upon learning 
that not-P, a person who has a belief that P would abandon that belief, 
whereas a person who has a desire that P would not.  This and other such 
modal differences stem from the very natures of belief and of desire, or of 
cognitive and conative attitudes more generally.  A belief that P would not be 
abandoned in reaction to a clear indication that not-P is not really a belief, or 
is at least a very defective belief.  Now, according to noncognitivist 
conceptions of moral and normative discourses we have already mentioned, 
which some have traced to Hume,89 our moral and normative judgments 
belong to the category of conative or noncognitive psychological attitudes.  If 
we were to adopt this view and combine it with the Humean modal 
separability point, then it would follow that the kinds of psychological 
 
86. See generally, e.g., ARTHUR N. PRIOR, LOGIC AND THE BASIS OF ETHICS (1949); Nicho-
las L. Sturgeon, Moral Skepticism and Moral Naturalism in Hume’s Treatise, 27 HUME STUD. 3 
(2001). 
87. See generally, e.g., MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL PROBLEM  92–129 (1994). 
88. Id. at 119.  The senses of “modal” and its cognates used here are different from the senses 
that Bobbitt and his followers use when they speak of different modalities of constitutional 
interpretation.  Or we believe that that is the case most of the time.  For Bobbitt’s discussion of what 
he means by “modality” see BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 27, at 11–
22. 
89. See SIMON BLACKBURN, ESSAYS IN QUASI-REALISM 5 (1993); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETH-
ICAL THEORY 205 (1959); J.L. MACKIE, HUME’S MORAL THEORY 52 (1980). 
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attitudes that moral and normative judgments are would be quite different, 
viz., modally separable, from the kinds of psychological attitudes that purely 
descriptive or factual judgments are.  Perhaps what Alexander has in mind is 
this modal separability point combined with the noncognitivist conception of 
normative judgments.  But once again, these philosophical themes do not 
help Alexander’s case against blended facts.  If noncognitivism is right, then 
in making normative judgments, we are not positing any facts but expressing 
our conative or noncognitive attitudes.  And in making what could be called 
“blended judgments”—i.e., judgments that deploy thick concepts like 
“weed,” “courageous,” etc.—we are describing some prosaic facts—e.g., that 
thing is a plant, that person fears yet confronts danger—and simultaneously 
expressing some conative attitudes—e.g., boo to that thing growing in the 
garden, hurray to that person.  There is nothing in Hume or Humean thinking 
that makes such combinations of cognitive and conative attitudes, or any 
verbal manifestations of them, problematic or illicit.  And if constitutional 
interpretation is a type of judgment that is partly factual and partly 
normative, we have the option of following the just-outlined Humean-
noncognitivist line of analyzing them as combinations of cognitive and 
conative psychological attitudes.90 
Simply put, there is no support in any serious philosophical themes we 
can think of for Alexander’s metaphysical objection to the blending of norms 
and facts.  And this further undercuts his claim that there is a metaphysical 
problem with blended facts.91 
 
90. For an exploration of the possibility that legal concepts are thick concepts and that legal 
judgments are blended judgments deploying such concepts, but without the noncognitivism, see 
Enoch & Toh, supra note 74. 
91. In his reaction to an initial draft of this Article, Alexander objected to our use of weeds and 
cowardice as counterexamples to his position.  According to him, weeds are plants that share certain 
biological properties and which we happen to share in our negative evaluations.  They do not really 
involve blending of facts and norms, in his opinion.  Alexander seems to think that a similar 
diagnosis of cowardice is available. See E-mail from Larry Alexander, Warren Distinguished 
Professor of Law, Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law, to authors (Feb. 7, 2013, 6:28 PM) (on file with 
authors).  But this reaction displays a misunderstanding of the kind of metanormative theorizing that 
is called for.  There are certain facts that look like they have normative properties of either blended 
or pure kinds.  Such facts count as data, and philosophers have come up with some standard 
strategies—the three that we have enumerated in the text—to explain such data.  See supra notes 
81–83 and accompanying text.  One of these is the noncognitivist strategy—(ii) in our list.  
Alexander is simply taking it for granted that that strategy is the one to go with to explain the 
“weediness” of certain plants and, presumably also, for the cowardliness of some people.  
Alexander presents no argument for that assumption.  Moreover, if this noncognitivist strategy is the 
way to go for weeds and cowards, why does it not work for other (apparent) blended facts?  Why in 
particular would it not work for apparently blended constitutional facts?  We could construe our 
judgments attributing such constitutional facts as cognitions of certain prosaic, empirical facts and 
our normative attitudes, of both moral and prudential kinds, of approving them.  Why would that 
not work?  Again, Alexander offers no argument.  Alexander is simply assuming that one 
metanormative strategy is the way to go for some of the data, and that no strategy works for some 
other parts of data.  But as far as we are aware, he has offered no argument for these assumptions 
and has offered no hint as to how to carve up the data. 
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IV. The Legal Version of the Combinability Problem 
There is no general epistemological problem about making judgments 
based on multiple sets or sorts of considerations.  Nor is there a general 
metaphysical problem about the possibility of combining facts and norms, or 
facts of different sorts.  Construed either of those two ways, the 
combinability problem is a pseudo-problem that gains traction only by way 
of confusions and misunderstandings.  Is there then anything to the worry 
that legal and constitutional theorists like Alexander and Fallon have 
expressed about combining multiple kinds of considerations, including some 
normative ones, in constitutional interpretation? 
A. Found or Made? 
We are not entirely sure.  But we believe that the following version of 
the problem may amount to the most compelling version of the combinability 
problem and is hence worth considering.  There is a possibility that many 
constitutional theorists, both originalists and even nonoriginalists, may be 
thinking (perhaps only implicitly) that any pluralist conception of 
constitutional interpretation implies or presupposes that there is no domain of 
preexisting legal facts that constitutional interpreters are supposed to be 
discovering or delineating.  That seems to be an impression given by the 
following characterization of constitutional interpretation by Justice Breyer, 
which we quoted once before: 
 In constitutional matters, too, language, history, purposes, and 
consequences all constrain the judge in that they separate better from 
worse answers even for the most open questions. . . . 
 . . . . 
 This may sound complicated, but consider how most practical 
arguments proceed: Should we invite your cousin to the wedding?  
Should we relocate the plant, when and where?  As is true of any 
practical argument, including moral arguments, rarely does a single 
theory provide a determinative answer.92 
It could seem quite unlikely that there is a fact of the matter as to whether a 
cousin should be invited to one’s wedding, where a plant should be located, 
and—to continue with the kind of questions that Breyer seems to have in 
mind—where one should take one’s vacation, which commuting route to 
take, which television program to watch, etc.  The world is populated with 
many different kinds of facts, the thinking goes, but the fact that a cousin 
should be invited to one’s wedding, or the fact that she should not be, is not 
one of them.93  And if there is no fact of the matter as to what the right 
 
92. BREYER, supra note 2, at 84–85; see supra text accompanying note 32. 
93. Some readers will think this is too quick.  Presumably there are cases in which there is a 
fact about whether a cousin should be invited to one’s wedding, including some in which the 
1774 Texas Law Review [Vol. 91:1739 
 
 
answers to such questions are, then it makes sense to think, as Breyer 
suggests, that there are only better and worse decisions to make, based on 
extrinsic considerations, to address such questions. 94   No decision about 
wedding invitations can really be right or wrong in the way that, for example, 
a scientific or mathematical or moral judgment can be right or wrong in 
delineating some domain of preexisting facts.  Instead, a decision can only be 
better or worse.  And discriminations between better and worse answers can 
proceed in light of other, “extraneous” facts or considerations that one can 
take into account in making up one’s mind.  And if constitutional 
interpretation is really like decisions about wedding invitations, as Breyer 
suggests, then the implications seem to be that there are no preexisting 
constitutional facts and that there can only be better and worse answers rather 
than right and wrong answers in constitutional interpretation.95 
 
considerations that determine the answer to that question point in different directions and are made 
of different stuff.  That is, in some cases when we struggle over an invitation decision and invoke 
disparate considerations such as those of reciprocity and forgiveness, cost, treating likes alike, 
respecting grievances and sensibilities of other family members, and so on, we believe—and believe 
correctly—that the struggle is to get the fact about what we are to do right, and not merely to make 
up our minds partly based on considerations that do not fully determine the answer.  In such cases 
(however relatively frequent or infrequent they may be), the plural considerations determine a fact 
of the matter in essentially the same way that the plural ultimate legal norms that we posited earlier 
determine legally correct answers to non-ultimate legal questions. 
94. Relevant here is the distinction between realism and voluntarism that we took note of in 
note 33 above. 
95. What Daniel Farber, one of the proponents of the practical-reasoning approach to legal 
interpretation in general, and one of the targets of Alexander’s criticisms, says about practical 
reason lends some credibility to this diagnosis.  Farber says: 
Advocates of practical reason . . . .  are most united by what they reject—the primary 
(or even exclusive) reliance on deduction as a method of analysis.  At the level of legal 
theory, practical reason means a rejection of foundationalism, the view that normative 
conclusions can be deduced from a single unifying value or principle.  At the level of 
judicial practice, practical reason rejects legal formalism, the view that the proper 
decision in a case can be deduced from a preexisting set of rules.  Both of these 
rejected techniques rely heavily on deductive logic (i.e., the syllogism) as the primary 
method of analysis.  Both endorse a procedure in which a court first explicitly 
identifies the applicable abstract rule or principle for a class of situations and then 
determines whether a particular situation belongs to the class. 
Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 
45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 539 (1992) (footnotes omitted).  The most salient feature of this 
characterization of the practical-reasoning approach to legal interpretation is the rejection of 
deductive reasoning.  But this is unfortunate and difficult to take seriously.  After all, not all of 
theoretical reasoning is deductive, and deduction is a crucial component of practical, nontheoretical 
reasoning.  When constitutional theorists like Barnett insist that the kind of reasoning involved in 
figuring out the meanings of the constitutional inscriptions is empirical reasoning, they are rejecting 
the practical reasoning approach and also not endorsing the view that constitutional interpretation 
consists solely of deductive reasoning.  Barnett, supra note 14, at 66 (“It cannot be overstressed that 
the activity of determining semantic meaning at the time of enactment . . . is empirical, not 
normative.”).  For no empirical scientist, or anyone else, conceives empirical reasoning as purely 
deductive reasoning.  Once we overlook the misguided emphasis on the rejection of deductivism, 
what we notice is that the proponents of the practical reasoning approach to legal interpretation are 
supposed to reject the view that legal interpretation has to do with delineating and deploying 
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The critics of pluralistic nonoriginalism may then be assuming that the 
appeals to multiple kinds of considerations and factors are indicative of 
nonoriginalists’ assumption that there is no domain of preexisting 
constitutional facts that the acts of constitutional interpretation are supposed 
to discover and delineate.  And the critics’ rejection of pluralism or 
combinability may be their rejection of that supposed assumption of the 
nonexistence of preexisting constitutional facts.  Originalists’ objection is not 
merely about judges taking into account many kinds of considerations in 
their acts of constitutional adjudication.  It also cannot be charitably 
interpreted as an objection about judges relying on multiple sets of evidence 
in their attempts to gain epistemic access to the constitutional law.  And it 
cannot be charitably interpreted as one about the possibility or actuality of 
there being facts that are constituted by facts and norms, or by facts of 
different varieties.  Those were the lessons of our discussion in the preceding 
Part.  Perhaps then the most charitable interpretation is that what Alexander, 
Fallon, and like-minded legal theorists are objecting to is the view, 
supposedly implied by pluralism, that there is no domain of preexisting 
constitutional facts that acts of constitutional interpretation are meant to 
discern. 
This fourth version of the combinability problem is not a moral–
political, epistemological, or metaphysical problem, but is instead a legal 
problem.  If it could be made out that the legal, and more specifically 
constitutional, facts that the acts of constitutional interpretation are meant to 
discover and delineate consist of the multiplicity of considerations or facts 
that pluralistic nonoriginalists treat as legitimate inputs into constitutional 
interpretation, then this fourth version of the objection to pluralistic 
nonoriginalism would be effectively disarmed.  Recall the originalist and 
nonoriginalist conceptions of the constitutional law from Part I: 
(OL) The Constitution or the constitutional law consists solely 
of the meanings of the inscriptions in the constitutional 
text. 
(NL) The Constitution or the constitutional law consists of 
multiple kinds of facts or considerations including: (i) the 
meanings of the inscriptions in the constitutional text; 
(ii) the Framers’ and ratifiers’ shared intentions; 
(iii) judicial precedents; (iv) extrajudicial societal 
practices; (v) moral values and norms; and (vi) the norm 
of prudence. 
In effect, the fourth version of the combinability problem that we are 
considering is that the idea that the Constitution or the constitutional law 
 
preexisting legal standards.  Instead, it seems, legal interpretation is supposed to be, at least in part, 
a creative endeavor. 
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consists of the different sets of considerations or facts of the sort that (NL) 
refers to makes little legal sense. 
As far as we can see, the picture of a pluralistic nonoriginalist 
conception of constitutional law that we presented in Part II goes a long way 
toward blunting this worry.  Recall the fourth and last observation we made 
in subpart I(A) above.  We pointed out that any kind of fact—semantic, 
psychological, historical, moral, prudential, etc.—could be legally relevant if 
they were made so by fundamental legal facts.  For example, the fact that a 
particular regime of criminal punishment calls for cruel and unusual 
punishment is a (partly) moral fact, and it is made legally relevant by the 
fundamental legal fact of the American legal system that inflictions of cruel 
and unusual punishments are constitutionally prohibited.  It then makes 
perfectly good sense in scrutinizing a regime of criminal punishment to delve 
into its moral properties.  Analogously, the fundamental legal facts that partly 
make up our Constitution may make relevant the various kinds of facts that 
(NL) enumerates.  And if this last possibility can be made out, then the fourth 
version of the combinability problem would be completely disarmed.  Surely, 
there would be no legal problem in combining the different kinds of facts that 
(NL) enumerates if the fundamental legal facts themselves call for combining 
them.  In other words, if the ultimate constitutional facts consist of anything 
like norms (a)–(g) that we outlined in Part II, subpart A, then there should be 
no legal problem with seeing the constitutional law, from the penultimate 
constitutional laws on down, as consisting of many different kinds of facts, 
including some normative considerations. 
Let us quickly sum up where we are.  According to the fourth and last 
version of the combinability problem, if there were multiple sets of 
determinants of the constitutional law, then judges could not be conceived as 
finding preexisting law, but instead must be conceived as making new law or 
acting in extralegal ways.  But if the Constitution or the constitutional law 
consisted of a set of fundamental legal facts or norms which make legally 
relevant a number of different kinds of facts—semantic, psychological, 
historical, sociological, moral, prudential, etc.—then judges and others could 
see the activity of constitutional interpretation that takes into account these 
myriad kinds of nonlegal facts as attempts to discover and delineate 
preexisting legal facts rather than as attempts to create new legal facts or act 
extralegally.96 
 
96. Our burden is to explain how preexisting legal facts can be determined by pluralistic 
ultimate legal facts even in cases where those ultimate legal facts point in different directions.  We 
do not mean to deny that there are also cases, presumably including some nontrivial percentage of 
the constitutional disputes that reach the U.S. Supreme Court, in which the ultimate legal norms 
bear indeterminately on the legal question that is presented, thus requiring judges either simply to 
will one of the non-defeated legal resolutions or to decide on extralegal grounds.  We take no 
position here on the relative frequency of these situations; we aim only to establish that there is no 
philosophical or legal problem with the fundamental pluralistic nonoriginalist tenet that pluralistic 
considerations can “combine” to constitute determinate non-ultimate legal facts.  In effect, the 
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Now, this is a conditional conclusion.  A fully thorough case for a 
pluralistic nonoriginalism would substantiate the antecedent of the 
conditional statement at the end of the preceding paragraph—that is, show 
that the Constitution or the constitutional law actually consists of a set of 
fundamental legal facts or norms that make legally relevant a number of 
different kinds of facts that (NL) or a variant enumerates—and thereby 
entitle us to detach the consequent.  Doing so is clearly beyond the scope of a 
stand-alone paper such as this.  In Part II, we merely presented one possible 
way in which the antecedent could be true, for illustrative purposes.  What 
we will now provide in the balance of this Article is a thumbnail sketch of 
how nonoriginalists can go about substantiating such an antecedent—in other 
words, the epistemological means that can be deployed to vindicate 
something like the view that we sketched in Part II. 
B. Wanted: A Non-Metaphysical Vindication 
One possible avenue that pluralistic nonoriginalists can take is to argue 
for some set of norms as the ultimate constitutional norms by relying on or 
exploiting the orthodox understanding of Hart’s theory of the nature of law 
that we discussed in subpart II(C) above.  According to that understanding, 
the ultimate constitutional norms of our legal system are the ones that are 
commonly accepted by the officials of our system.  We have already thrown 
a lot of cold water on this way of proceeding. 
We are also skeptical of the broad family of approaches, of which this 
orthodox Hartian approach is a member, that try to vindicate a particular 
legal thesis about what the constitutional law consists of.  Each approach 
belonging to this family appeals to the metaphysical nature of something, or 
some noncontingent features of it, to vindicate a particular legal thesis.  We 
have just referred to an approach that appeals to the nature of law, or the 
nature of legal systems, to vindicate a pluralist nonoriginalist conception of 
the most fundamental constitutional facts.  Actually, nonoriginalists are not 
the only ones who have opted for approaches belonging to this family.  As 
noted earlier, Larry Solum has appealed to the very same Hartian conception 
of the nature of law, or of legal systems, to argue for an originalist 
conception of the fundamental constitutional law.97  And many originalists 
have appealed to the nature of other things—communication, written texts, 
interpretation, authority, etc.—to argue for their originalist legal theses.  As 
 
constitutional picture is much like the case of wedding invitations discussed earlier.  See supra note 
93 and accompanying text.  Sometimes plural ultimate norms or facts determine non-ultimate facts 
within a domain, and sometimes they underdetermine non-ultimate facts; the relative frequencies of 
the actual situations cannot be determined a priori. 
97. See supra note 46. 
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one of us has argued at length elsewhere, the existing attempts have been less 
than successful.98 
These arguments from the metaphysical nature of things for legal theses 
about what the constitutional law consists of bear some resemblance to the 
tradition in moral philosophy of arguing from the metaphysical nature of 
various things for some ultimate moral principles.  For example, Aristotle 
infers a particular conception of eudaimonia, or of human flourishing—
actually, many would say, two distinct conceptions—from his conception of 
the nature of man,99 and Kant argues for the categorical imperative from his 
conception of practical reason, or that of rational agency.100  More specifi-
cally, there are arguments for the fundamental principles of particular kinds 
of practices—e.g., punishment, promise-keeping—by appeals to the nature of 
those practices.101 
The approach that John Rawls has taken in A Theory of Justice and 
elsewhere for his two principles of justice exemplifies an alternative tradition 
in moral philosophy.  Instead of appealing to the nature of something to 
vindicate these two principles of justice, which are meant to be the most 
fundamental principles of political justice, Rawls argues that, among the 
competing conceptions of political justice, those two principles mesh best 
with our considered judgments, or the judgments of political justice in which 
we have the highest degree of confidence.102  The kind of vindication we 
ought to seek, Rawls is opining, is not something that we can extract from 
the nature of anything, but instead something we get by reaching, through 
reflective processes, which involve needed adjustments at both ends, a point 
where the fundamental moral principles we accept and our considered moral 
judgments form a conflict-free and mutually supporting set.  This is the 
famed method of reflective equilibrium.  The legal analogue of this mode of 
argumentation is what we believe is the way to go in our attempts to establish 
 
98. Berman, supra note 18. 
99. See 2 ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE I.7.1-
097a15–.1098b8, X.7.1177a11–1178a8, at 1734–36, 1860–62 (Bollingen Series No. 71, Jonathan 
Barnes ed., 1984) (Revised Oxford Translation); see also JOHN M. COOPER, REASON AND HUMAN 
GOOD IN ARISTOTLE 1–143 (1986); Thomas Nagel, Aristotle on Eudaimonia, in ESSAYS ON 
ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS 7 (Amélie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980). 
100. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor 
ed., 1998); see also J. DAVID VELLEMAN, A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics, in SELF TO SELF 
16 (2006). 
101. See, e.g., John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955) [hereinafter Rawls, 
Two Concepts], reprinted in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS 20 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).  
As we are about to point out in the text, Rawls’s work in general exemplifies an approach to doing 
moral philosophy that is an alternative to the one that his Two Concepts presents. 
102. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); see also John Rawls, Kantian Con-
structivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515 (1980), reprinted in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED 
PAPERS, supra note 101, at 303; John Rawls, The Independence of Moral Theory, PROC. & 
ADDRESSES OF THE AM. PHIL. ASS’N, Nov. 1975, at 5, reprinted in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED 
PAPERS, supra note 101, at 286; T.M. Scanlon, Rawls on Justification, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO RAWLS 139 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003). 
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some set of norms as the ultimate constitutional norms of our legal system 
and thereby vindicate the crucial antecedent of the conditional conclusion we 
stated in the preceding subpart. 
Some have argued that a vindication or confirmation of our fundamental 
moral principles must rely on something more solid and more independent of 
our moral views than our considered moral judgments.  In particular, R.M. 
Hare, one of the other great moral philosophers of the twentieth century, 
argued that the fundamental moral principle—in his view, the principle of 
act-utilitarianism—can and should be inferred from the nature of our moral 
discourse, or, more particularly, from the meanings of our moral terms, and 
that Rawls’s approach of reflective equilibrium seeks to vindicate the 
fundamental principles of morality by reliance on too unstable or ephemeral 
a basis.103  A number of moral philosophers, however, have in turn responded 
to Hare that in order to argue for some ultimate principle of morality, we 
must deploy substantive moral arguments and not merely conceptual or 
linguistic intuitions; and further that Hare himself in effect reads much of 
substantive and controversial moral positions into the meanings of moral 
terms.104  Even if a convincing case could be made that a particular ultimate 
principle of morality is required by the meanings of moral terms, we can 
always ask: first, why we should not think that our moral language has built 
into it moral mistakes, just as our talk of “sunrise” and “sunset” incorporates 
a defective cosmology; and second, relatedly, why we should not proceed to 
talk slightly differently to dispense with the unwanted implication.  These are 
lessons that are generalizable to any attempts to vindicate some fundamental 
principle by appealing to the nature of something.105 
In any case, at the very least, the approach provided by reflective 
equilibrium presents a genuine alternative to the approach of trying to 
vindicate an ultimate principle or a set of them by appealing to the nature of 
something.  And it is not only in moral philosophy that this alternative 
approach is available.  Nelson Goodman’s deployment of reflective 
equilibrium to choose among competing conceptions of the rules of 
 
103. See generally R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND POINT (1981); 
R.M. Hare, Foundationalism and Coherentism in Ethics, in MORAL KNOWLEDGE? 190 (Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons eds., 1996). 
104. See generally, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Foundations of Impartiality, in HARE AND CRIT-
ICS: ESSAYS ON MORAL THINKING 101 (Douglas Seanor & N. Fotion eds., 1988); Bernard 
Williams, The Structure of Hare’s Theory, in HARE AND CRITICS, supra, at 185.  There is also the 
criticism that Hare is not actually able to derive act-utilitarianism from the meanings of moral terms.  
See generally Allan Gibbard, Hare’s Analysis of ‘Ought’ and Its Implications, in HARE AND 
CRITICS, supra, at 57. 
105. For example, even if, as Rawls early on argued, the nature of punishment requires that 
only the guilty get punished, it is open for us to wonder whether we should opt for a slightly 
different practice—call it, as Rawls does, “telishment,” Rawls, Two Concepts, supra note 101, at 
27—that would allow infliction of some penalties on innocent people in some exceptional 
circumstances. 
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deductive and inductive inference was nearly contemporaneous with Rawls’s 
first introduction of the method.106  And we do not see any reason to think 
that this approach is unavailable or unsuitable for vindicating a nonoriginalist 
legal thesis, a version of (NL), about what the constitutional law consists of.  
In fact, in his many seminal writings, Dworkin has been a practitioner and an 
advocate of the method of reflective equilibrium.  Eschewing what he calls 
“Archimedean epistemology,” Dworkin has urged what he calls “integrated” 
epistemology, which essentially is a reflective-equilibrium epistemology.107  
He has argued that the way to argue for a first-order moral position is to 
show how it fits into a network of first-order moral positions that are 
plausible. 108   And, more specifically in legal philosophy, he has long 
championed a particular form of coherence, which he calls “integrity,” as the 
chief guiding ideal of first-order legal reasoning.109 
But a note of caution is in order here to prevent any confusion of our 
position with Dworkin’s.  What we believe that judges should be striving for 
is a reflective equilibrium between a set of ultimate legal or constitutional 
norms on the one hand and our considered constitutional or legal judgments 
on the other.110  It follows that we should not be looking for a set of moral 
principles that would mesh with or justify our considered constitutional or 
legal judgments.  This is the move that Dworkin makes in his deployment of 
the method of reflective equilibrium in his legal and constitutional theorizing, 
and we believe that it leads him astray.  A telltale sign that this is a mistake is 
that Dworkin has much difficulty accounting for the possibility of legal 
systems, the laws of which are fundamentally unjust and hence not morally 
justifiable.111   We do not think that the nature of law, or anything else, 
imposes a requirement that the ultimate constitutional norms are those that 
can justify the norms of our legal system or our legal practices.  The actual 
 
106. Compare NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION, AND FORECAST 62–66 (4th ed. 1983) (pas-
sages from lectures originally delivered in 1953), with John Rawls, Outline of a Decision Procedure 
for Ethics, 60 PHIL. REV. 177 (1951), reprinted in COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 101, at 1. 
107. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 82–86 (2011) [hereinafter DWORKIN, 
HEDGEHOGS]; Ronald Dworkin, Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy, 24 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004), reprinted in JUSTICE IN ROBES 140, 160–61 (2006); Ronald 
Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 118–19, 128 
(1996) [hereinafter Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth]. 
108. See DWORKIN, HEDGEHOGS, supra note 107, at 191–324. 
109. See generally DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 37.  Cf. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra 
note 37. 
110. Similarly, Goodman observes: “An inductive inference, . . . is justified by conformity to 
general rules, and a general rule by conformity to accepted inductive inferences.”  GOODMAN, supra 
note 106, at 64.  What Goodman is calling “accepted inductive inferences” are what we, following 
Rawls’s terminology, would call “considered inductive judgments.”  See Rawls, supra note 106, at 
181–83. 
111. Hart lodges this objection to Dworkin’s position in H.L.A. Hart, Legal Duty and Obliga-
tion, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 127, 150 (1982).  Dworkin responds in DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 
supra note 37, at 111–13; H.L.A. Hart, Comment, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY: THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 35, 41 (Ruth Gavison ed., 1987) [hereinafter 
ISSUES]; Ronald Dworkin, Legal Theory and the Problem of Sense, in ISSUES, supra, at 9. 
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ultimate constitutional norms of the American legal system may be capable 
of providing such a justification.  But that would be a contingently fortunate 
feature of our legal system.112 
To repeat what we said at the end of the last subpart, if the Constitution 
or the constitutional law consisted of a set of fundamental legal facts or 
norms which make legally relevant a number of different kinds of facts—
semantic, psychological, historical, sociological, moral, prudential, etc.—
then judges and others could see the activity of constitutional interpretation 
that takes into account these myriad kinds of nonlegal facts as attempts to 
discover and delineate preexisting legal facts rather than as exercises in 
creating new legal facts or acting extralegally.  What we have argued in this 
subpart is that the way to substantiate the antecedent of that conditional 
conclusion is to deploy the epistemological method of reflective equilibrium.  
Obviously, we are not in a position to carry out the process of reflective 
equilibrium and thereby spell out the very long and complex statement of the 
most fundamental constitutional facts of the American legal system.  But 
here, we are not in any worse position than that of originalists.  Because 
originalists have not been able to provide a vindication of (OL), or some 
version of it, by appealing to the nature of something, they too are in a 
position of having to try to vindicate it by some alternative means, and the 
method of reflective equilibrium is the obvious natural way to go.  This 
means that (OL) and (NL) are in quite analogous positions, and that both 
originalists and nonoriginalists will have to deploy arguments to show that 
some legal thesis meshes better with our considered constitutional 
judgments, and more generally with our considered legal judgments, than 
any competing legal thesis.  And without going through the hard and long 
slog of reflective equilibrium to show that there is no version of (NL) that 
meshes better with our considered constitutional judgments than any version 
of (OL), originalists like Alexander are not in a good position to claim that 
nonoriginalism suffers from any version of the combinability problem. 
Lest what we are proposing here sound excessively theoretical or 
philosophical, or both, let us point out that the epistemological method of 
 
112. An important difference between Dworkin’s and our positions may be worth mentioning.  
Although we, like Dworkin, believe that the ultimate determinants of our constitutional law are the 
ultimate constitutional norms (and the nonlegal facts that those norms make legally relevant), and 
not some metaphysical facts, and hence that our first-order constitutional or legal thinking does not 
bottom out with some metaphysical theorizing, we, unlike Dworkin, think that our first-order 
constitutional and legal conclusions must mesh or hang together with our conclusions in our 
metaphysics, epistemology, semantics, psychology, etc.  Dworkin’s writings from the mid-1990s 
and on have vigorously argued that first-order normative thinking can proceed without any regard 
for our conclusions in any of the meta-normative disciplines.  See DWORKIN, HEDGEHOGS, supra 
note 107; Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth, supra note 107.  We believe his position here is 
exaggerated and unwarranted, and very much against the regulative epistemic ideal of wide 
reflective equilibrium that Rawls has endorsed.  On this point, see Toh, Jurisprudential Theories, 
supra note 42. 
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reflective equilibrium is the method of reasoning that judges and lawyers 
instinctively and commonly resort to in their legal deliberations.  To give just 
an example, think of Justice Holmes’s famous dissenting opinion in Lochner 
v. New York,113 in which he said: 
It is settled by various decisions of this court that state constitutions 
and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we as legislators 
might think as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as this, and 
which equally with this interfere with the liberty to contract.  Sunday 
laws and usury laws are ancient examples.  A more modern one is the 
prohibition of lotteries.  The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so 
long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, 
which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is 
interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or 
municipal institution which takes his money for purposes thought 
desirable, whether he likes it or not.  The Fourteenth Amendment does 
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.114 
Here, Holmes is employing the method of reflective equilibrium, and he is 
asserting the view that our legal system’s ultimate constitutional norms may 
include morally incorrect norms.115  Justice Scalia has similarly deployed the 
method of reflective equilibrium in a series of significant recent dissents.  For 
example, in the 2005 case Roper v. Simmons,116 the Supreme Court appealed 
to a prevailing consensus among advanced foreign countries to disallow an 
imposition of a death penalty on a minor.117  Such appeals to legal consensus 
in foreign countries also occurred in a number of other cases as well.118  In 
Roper and elsewhere, Scalia has objected to the Court’s seemingly 
inconsistent and opportunistic appeals to foreign laws.119  Scalia was pointing 
out that a fundamental constitutional norm that Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion posited and appealed to—which Scalia characterized as “the basic 
premise . . . that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the 
world”120—does not mesh with the reasoning of many other Supreme Court 
cases that are unimpeachable.121  He was in effect arguing that the basic 
premise of the Court’s reasoning does not pass the test of reflective 
equilibrium.  Scalia has similarly objected to the seemingly inconsistent and 
opportunistic appeals by the Court’s majorities to the doctrine of 
 
113. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
114. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
115. We can discount Holmes’s excesses in advocating the prediction and command theories of 
law in his less estimable, jurisprudentially self-conscious hours. 
116. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
117. Id. at 575–78. 
118. E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815, 830–31 (1988). 
119. E.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 624–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
120. Id. at 624. 
121. See id. at 624–28. 
2013] Pluralistic Nonoriginalism 1783 
 
 
 
precedent,122 and to the developing moral consensus in our society on various 
issues (or “emerging awareness” as Justice Kennedy put it in Lawrence v. 
Texas123) in order to identify and delineate the contours of unenumerated 
rights in the Fourteenth Amendment.124  We find Scalia’s complaints and 
more generally his call for coherence and consistency in the Court’s 
reasoning quite compelling.  The Justices of the Supreme Court too often 
appeal to some fundamental constitutional norms without sufficiently 
minding how those norms mesh with our considered constitutional 
judgments, and their appeals consequently all too often take on the 
appearance of being ad hoc and opportunistic.  And the same complaint 
could be made about Scalia’s own proposal, made in Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 125  about the level of generality at which the scope of 
constitutionally recognized liberties should be defined.126  What more con-
scientious and able judges should do is formulate the versions of the 
fundamental constitutional norms that are more disciplined by and consistent 
with the plethora of constitutional judgments that are considered 
unproblematic and unimpeachable.  Unlike Scalia, we happen to believe that 
the doctrine of precedent, something close to what could be called “the 
doctrine of jus gentium” (which calls for some deference to prevailing 
consensus in foreign law),127 and a norm that calls for updating the content of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in light of developing societal mores are likely to 
be constituents of our fundamental constitutional law.  But these surmises 
need to be subjected to the tests of reflective equilibrium.  And in any case, 
judges should be appealing to the versions of these fundamental norms that 
have good prospects of meshing well with our considered constitutional 
judgments. 
Far from being exotic or excessively theoretical, the epistemological 
method of reflective equilibrium is very much practiced by judges in their 
daily work, and its demands and constraints can be observed in their 
interactions with each other, including Scalia’s criticisms of the majority 
positions in a number of important recent Supreme Court cases.  It is this 
very method that we are proposing as the way to determine whether our 
Constitution or constitutional law consists merely of the meanings of the 
 
122. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 993–94 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority’s version of stare decisis as a 
“keep-what-you-want-and-throw-away-the-rest version”). 
123. 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003). 
124. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 616–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning the Court’s methods in 
identifying and adopting what they deem to be a moral consensus). 
125. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
126. Id. at 127 n.6. 
127. See JEREMY WALDRON, “PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND”: FOREIGN LAW IN 
AMERICAN COURTS 28 (2012). 
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inscriptions in the constitutional text, or also of other facts that pluralistic 
nonoriginalist views of the Constitution enumerate. 
Conclusion 
The bottom line is that whether an originalist or nonoriginalist view of 
what our Constitution or constitutional law consists of is better than others 
depends on the fundamental constitutional facts of our legal system.  And 
there are no a priori grounds for thinking that a pluralistic nonoriginalist 
conception of those fundamental constitutional facts is a nonstarter, or 
incomprehensible as Alexander has declared.  As the reader will have 
gathered from what we have written above, our own bet is with pluralistic 
nonoriginalism.  But our central point has been that there is no shortcut to 
figuring out which view is better, and that the only way of arbitrating 
between the two is the long and hard slog of reflective equilibrium.  
Pluralistic nonoriginalism is in good epistemological and metaphysical 
shape, contrary to what some legal theorists have argued.  The only 
remaining question is whether it is legally accurate. 
